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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys some of the trends in private mining law
during the 1980's-the period from 1980 through 1989. It focuses
on legal disputes between private parties. The field of battle is oc-
cupied by many different interests: lessors and lessees, buyers and
sellers of mineral interests, surface owners and mineral owners, and
owners of one mineral and owners of another beneath the same
surface tract. Some of these disputes, resolved during the 80's, cen-
tered on the interpretation of agreements-deeds, leases, and con-
tracts-made decades earlier. Other disputes involved new
agreements, new materials, new markets, and new development
methods. Many of the cases during the 80's are noteworthy only
because they demonstrate some courts' continued application of tra-
ditional and well recognized methods of analysis. Other cases, how-
ever, provide insights into new analyses.
While this article is primarily aimed at developments in the hard
minerals area, it is important to. keep in mind that the problems
which confront hard mineral developers are similar to those which
confront oil and gas producers as well. Thus, the excellent discussion
of changes in private law affecting oil and gas development during
the Twentieth Century by Professor Ernest E. Smith is highly per-
tinent to the issues addressed in this article.) Professor Smith's de-
scription of the changing nature of the oil and gas producer's rights
in the surface estates illustrates that the problems of all mineral
developers, regardless of how densely compacted the molecules of
their product, are very closely related. 2
The 1970's may be remembered as the decade of federal envi-
ronmental legislation. The Clean Water Act,3 the Clean Air Act,4
the Toxic Substances Control Act,5 Coastal Zone Management Act, 6
1. Smith, Evolution of Oil and Gas Rights in the Eastern United States, 10 E. MIN. L. INST.
ch. 16 (1989).
2. Id. §§ 16.03 - 16.07.
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7641 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988).
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MINING LA W IN THE 1980's
the Safe Drinking Water Act,1 the Solid Waste Disposal Act and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 8 among others, took
shape during that period. 9 For the coal industry, this flurry of ac-
tivity culminated in the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 10 During the 1980's, much of industry's en-
ergies were expended battling, within the public arena, the proper
interpretation and implementation of these statutes."
At the same time, private disputes were fought within the court
system and being resolved in piecemeal fashion, as they usually are.
It is fairly easy to see the potential impact of federal environmental
legislation and regulatory agency interpretations in this area. Con-
stitutional requirements of due process mandate the availability of
a forum in which these actions may be tested.12 It is more difficult
to recognize the effect of individual disputes on the reshaping of
legal rules. In certain areas changes have been occurring through
the litigation process which may be every bit as significant to the
industry's long term health as SMCRA. Yet, the places and ways
in which these changes occur make them far less visible.
Most private mineral law litigation during the 80's was no dif-
ferent than that of earlier times. Courts typically grappled with the
following issues: Was a particular mineral conveyed as part of the
mineral estate? Has the mineral estate ended? Does the mineral es-
tate hold the right to engage in particular ancillary activities? Some-
times courts used traditional approaches in resolving these issues."
Where, however, the mineral estate was created a long time earlier
and where no recent mineral development had occurred, legislatures
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-1l (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
8. Id. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
9. For a general review of federal environmental legislation impacting on mining activities,
see Manthey, Mining, the Environment, and Government (1883-1983): Environmental Constraints on
Open Pit Mining, 4 E. Mm. L. INsT. ch. 3 (1983).
10. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11. For a review of the first 10 years of federal activity under SMCRA, see Macleod, Means
& Chetlin, State Primacy under the Surface Mining Act: The First Decade, 9 E. Mm. L. INST. ch.
5 (1988).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Id. amend. XIV § 1; J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CON-
STrrUTIONAL LAw ch. 12, § III (2d ed. 1983).
13. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
1990]
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and courts began examining these problems differently. 14 The bal-
ance between mineral development and surface use is being revised
in myriad ways. Some are slight and subtle; others, significant and
startling. Quite often statutes adopted to protect public interests have
played an important role in the revision of private rights. There are
suggestions in the cases that these statutes may play an even greater
role in the future. 15
II. OWNERSHIP, CONVEYANCING, AND TITLE-
BASIC PROPERTY MATTERS
A. Ownership
Basic conveyancing principles have not been significantly affected
by the other changes taking shape in the 1980's. The method of
creating a mineral estate or other interest, the type of interest cre-
ated, and the techniques for interpreting conveyancing language re-
main largely unaffected by other trends. Courts still look to the
grantor's intent to decide what type of interest was created.16
The question of what substances constitute "minerals"" in a
severance was an issue presented by several cases. The questions of
the right to mine barite,18 limestone, 9 sand and gravel, 20 and even
the right to remove and sell subsoil in a limestone lease21 were lit-
igated. The decisions are generally consistent in holding that, unless
the deed or lease expressly states otherwise, substances which might
14. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
16. E.g., Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Co., 513 Pa. 192, 200, 519 A.2d 385, 389-90 (1986).
17. See generally, Carpenter, Oil and Gas in Grants and Reservations of "Minerals": When
Is a Mineral Not a "Mineral?" 5 E. MIN. L. INST. ch. 10 (1984). Recognizing the inevitability of
conceptual overlap, the author makes a useful distinction between "consensus minerals," which usually
pass under a severance, and "surface substances," which may not pass even though they have some
or all of the characteristics of "minerals," including value apart from the land.
18. Christensen v. Chromalloy American Corp., 99 Nev. 34, 656 P.2d 844 (1983).
19. E.g., Payne v. Hoover, Inc., 486 So. 2d 426 (Ala. 1986); Southern Title Insurance Co. v.
Oiler, 268 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
20. West v. Godair, 538 So. 2d 322 (La. Ct. App. 1989) writ granted, rev'd 542 So. 2d 1386
(La. 1989), reh'g denied 546 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1989) (language of instrument was ambiguous; grantors'
extrinsic evidence insufficient to show intent to reserve sand, gravel, and topsoil).
21. McKinley v. Nutt, 697 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
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fit some technical definition of the term were not intended to pass
"with a conveyance of "minerals" if the means for removal of them
will be inconsistent with continued enjoyment of the surface estate. 2
Most courts today are not willing to presume that the surface owner
intended to authorize mineral development activities which would
substantially diminish the surface land's utility. That intent must be
expressed in the severance document or necessarily implied from
general knowledge of mineral development in the area.23
The Supreme Court of Texas held to the contrary. In Moser v.
U.S. Steel Co.,24 that court reversed a line of cases applying the
more common reasoning25 and concluded that all substances having
value, whether or not known at the time of severance, are included
in the generic terms "minerals" or "other minerals." 26 Recognizing
that it was announcing an unanticipated change in Texas law, the
court determined that its holding should only apply prospectively. 27
Further, it preserved prior decisions which had held, as a matter of
law, that certain substances such as limestone, sand and gravel, and
"near surface lignite, iron and coal" were not "minerals.'"2
The court found that the surface enjoyment test had not proven
useful in determining the intent of parties to a severance of "min-
erals" and surface. Instead, the Texas court concluded that the in-
quiry should focus on the "general intent" of the parties without
regard to the technical or scientific meaning of the term "miner-
als. '"29 Essentially, this test places the burden on the surface owner
to limit the extent of a severance by express language in the con-
veying instrument.
22. E.g., Rysavy v. Novotny, 401 N.W.2d 540 (S.D. 1987). See generally, Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d
383 (1976).
23. See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
24. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
25. E.g., Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) (Reed II); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d
348 (Tex. 1971).
26. 676 S.W.2d at 103.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. The court relied upon the theory of "general intent" as set forth in Kuntz, The Law Relating
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The Moser holding does, however, provide the surface owner
with some protection against permanent loss of surface use from
mineral development. Where the substance is one specifically men-
tioned in the severance, the mineral estate is only liable for damage
to the surface estate caused by its negligence in conducting its re-
moval operations. Where the right to develop exists for a generically
described "mineral" or "other mineral," the surface owner is en-
titled to compensation for surface damage even if the injury does
not result from the operator's negligence. 0
Courts in Pennsylvania and Alabama addressed the issue of which
party retained ownership of coalbed methane gas after severance of
coal or gas rights from surface ownership. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decided, by a divided vote, that coalbed gas was owned
by the coal estate because: (1) ownership of the coal seam carried
with it all other substances located therein as a matter of law, absent
a contrary intent in the severance instrument, and (2) when this coal
estate had been severed from the surface, coalbed gas was a det-
riment, not a benefit, to its owner so that, as a factual issue, the
surface owner would not have intended to retain ownership.31 In so
holding, the court reversed two lower court decisions, which had
held in favor of the gas lessee on the ownership question because
the coal owner would not have intended to acquire ownership of
this gas precisely because the gas was so dangerous. The lower courts,
while recognizing the gas lessee as owner of the coalbed gas, severely
restricted the methods which that lessee could use to recover the
gas. Applying nuisance principles, these courts prohibited the use
of enhanced gas production methods which would interfere with the
coal owner's ability to mine the coal or which would threaten the
coal miners' safety.32
A federal district court in Alabama, in an unreported opinion,
found, as a matter of fact, that a reservation of oil and gas rights
30. 676 S.W.2d at 103.
31. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 503 Pa. 140, 468 A.2d 1380 (1983), rev'g 304 Pa. Super. 182,
450 A.2d 162 (1982), noted in Note, United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge. A Judicial Decision Which
Fails to Solve the Coalbed Gas Ownership Problem, 85 W. VA. L. Ray. 803 (1983); Note, Ownership
of Coal Bed Gas: United States Steel Corporation v. Hoge 82 W. VA. L. REv. 383 (1980). The trial
court decision can be found in I E. MiN. L. INST. ch. 7, app. (1980).
32. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 304 Pa. Super. 182, 450 A.2d 162 (1982).
[Vol. 92
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in a coal severance did not include the right to produce methane
gas from the coal seam.3 The coal severance contained specific re-
quirements for wells which might be drilled "through the coal seam."
Therefore, the parties to the severance had not intended to allow
gas wells to produce from the coal seam.
There were enough cases deciding issues of basic property law
to make up a substantial part of any first year property casebook.
One ever-present and reoccurring title problem involves the effect
of a previous owner's exception or reservation of mineral rights. 4
During this period, cases generally were decided in the grantor's
33. Rayburn v. USX Corp., (N.D. Ala. 1987), (available April 1, 1990, on LEXIS, Genfed.
library, Dist file). aff'd without opinion, 844 F.2d 796 (lth Cir. 1988).
34. Technically, an "exception" is the retention of some thing or some right which existed in
the grantor before the conveyance, while a "reservation" is the creation of a new legal right-one
which did not exist while the grantor held the estate-passing to the grantor from the grantee. There-
fore, also technically, a grantor "excepts" an interest in minerals when conveying the remainder of
its estate to a third party as the minerals were in existence before the conveyance. Whitaker v. Brown,
46 Pa. 197 (Pa. 1864). The same grantor may "reserve" an easement over the estate conveyed in
favor of other land of that grantor as the easement had no physical or legal existence prior to the
conveyance. Moffitt v. Lytle, 165 Pa. 173 (Pa. 1895).
Drafters of many deeds, and many lawyers and judges, are unaware of this technical distinction.
If the drafter did not avoid the problem by "excepting and reserving" everything the grantor wanted,
courts today tend to ignore the actual words used and focus upon the grantor's intent to retain some
interest or right in the property transferred. See Goin v. Eater, 107 I11. App. 3d 887, 438 N.E.2d
234 (1982), in which the court was aware of the technical distinction and found it useful, but still
decided the issue on the basis of the grantor's intent as determined from all the words in the deed.
See also Burnett v. Perkins, 523 So. 2d 106 (Ala. 1988) where the court ignored the technical distinction
altogether; Morgan v. Roberts, 434 So. 2d 738 (Ala. 1983); Shawville Coal Co. v. Menard, 280 Pa.
Super. 610, 421 A.2d 1099 (1980) (slight difference in language of reservation and exception clause
and granting clause resulted in joint ownership of minerals and mining rights).
In O'Brien v. Village Land Co., 780 P.2d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (cert. granted Sept. 11, 1989),
the deed into the Village contained a reservation of one-half of "all oil, gas and other minerals" in
favor of its grantor. The deed from the Village to plaintiff's decedent contained both a reservation
of one-half of "all oil, gas and other minerals" and an exception for "all other items and agreements
of record." The trial court found the deed was unambiguous and conveyed the Village's one-half
mineral interest to its grantee. The appellate court agreed that the deed was unambiguous and, relying
on the technical distinction between reservations and exceptions, held that the deed conveyed one-
quarter of the minerals to the Village's grantee so that the Village's grantor owned one-half the
minerals, the Village owned one-quarter, and the plaintiff's decedent owned one-quarter. Texas uses
yet another approach, depending on whether the reservation is of the land "described" in the deed
or of the land "conveyed" by the deed. If of the land "described," the entire one-half originally
conveyed to the Village would have remained with it under its reservation; if of the land "conveyed,"
the Village would have retained only one-quarter of the minerals. Averyt v. Grande, 717 S.W.2d 891
(rex. 1986). Fragmentation of ownership because of these tenuous and tendentious distinctions is
exactly the situation which the Duhig rule is designed to avoid. See infra note 36.
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favor, using long-settled rules of construction.15 Where the grantor
purports to retain an interest which had been severed from the estate
sometime before the conveyance in question, courts generally find
that the reservation is ineffective to vest any interest in the grantor. 6
Some cases are almost refreshing for their continued adherence
to these well-established principles. For example, in International
Salt Co. v. Geostow, the Second Circuit considered the question of
ownership of the strata being mined. 37 That court concluded that
the owner of the mineral estate (salt) continued to own the space
from which the mineral had been extracted so long as mining op-
erations continued. This ruling is consistent with the position taken
by most eastern mining states, although many of these states put
this issue to rest long ago.38
B. Divided Ownership and the Law of Waste
Mineral cases are always fruitful sources of title problems which
involve future interests and concurrent ownership. During the 80's,
the states of Florida and Tennessee both addressed the application
of the Rule Against Perpetuities 39 to reserved perpetual royalty in-
terests following severance of the surface and mineral estate. 40 Each
35. Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Holliman, 504 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 1987); Turner v. Lassiter, 484
So. 2d 378 (Ala. 1986) (Both of these cases illustrate that failure to include an exception or reservation
in a granting clause is not fatal to retention of minerals where intent is adequately expressed elsewhere
in the deed.)
36. E.g., Hill v. Gilliam, 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985) and Peterson v. Simpson, 286
Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 720 (1985). These cases invoked the rule of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber
Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940) in interpreting conveyances excepting fractional mineral
interests of the same size as previously severed to find that the grantee took all of the grantor's
interest in the minerals. A similar result was reached without reference to the Duhig rule in Cole v.
Minor, 518 So. 2d 61 (Ala. 1987).
37. 878 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1989).
38. E.g., Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 99 W. Va. 435, 129 S.E. 311 (1925); Moore
v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 75 Ohio St. 493, 80 N.E. 6 (1907); Webber v. Vogel, 189 Pa. 156, 42
A. 4 (1899); Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293, 22 A. 1035 (1891); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d
665 (1962).
39. "No intrerest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest." J. C. GRAY, Ta RuL AoAiNsT PERunTrrEs §
201 (4th ed. 1942). For a modern statement of the Rule and means for alleviating its common law
force, see REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DoNATrE TRANSFERS §§ 1.1 - 2.2 (1983).
40. Conway Land, Inc., v. Terry, 542 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1989); J. M. Huber Corp. v. Square
Enterprises, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
[Vol. 92
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court found that the reservation had created a presently vested in-
terest in real property in the grantor which did not violate the in-
famous Rule, despite the fact that minerals might never be produced.
The ability to divide the ownership of an estate (either over time
between present and future owners, or concurrently, among several
owners) will always tease mineral developers with the following ques-
tions: From whom must one get permission to develop? Where are
they? How long can that permission last?
Central to divided ownership problems is the law of waste. The
law of waste is designed to assure each owner of a portion of the
fee the ability to enjoy its own share of the property and no more.41
Thus, where a life tenant begins mineral development without the
consent of all the future interest holders, the rights of those future
interest holders have been unlawfully diminished. This may also be
true when one of several cotenants extracts minerals without the join-
der of its cotenants. In each of these scenarios, the developer seeks
to appropriate to itself something of value which belongs to another.
1. Life Estates and Future Interests
Where an estate is divided between present and future interests,
usually between a life tenant and remaindermen, the future interest
holder is entitled to receive the estate undiminished by the life ten-
ant's actions with the exception of reasonable wear and tear. 42 The
life tenant's ability to develop the minerals is determined by the
intent of the creator of the divided ownership. Only where the cre-
ator intended to allow the life tenant to enjoy the minerals, thereby
diminishing the value of the remainder for the future interest holder,
may the life tenant develop or lease the minerals, or receive income
from their development. 43
Most jurisdictions employ the "open mines doctrine" as a guide
to determining the creator's intent when it has not otherwise been
expressed. Under this doctrine, a life tenant may exploit the minerals
41. 5 Am. L. oF PROP. § 20.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
42. 1 Id. § 2.16e.
43. 5 Id. § 20.6.
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or share in the proceeds of development only if that development
had begun before the life estate took effect. 44 Otherwise, mineral
development by the life tenant is actionable as waste. Even where
the life tenant is authorized to develop the minerals, there will be
a question as to whether the life tenant can grant development per-
mission which will last longer than the life estate.
The "open mines doctrine" is only a rule of construction, a
means of determining the grantor's intent where that intent is not
otherwise expressed. During the 80's, a Pennsylvania court found
it inappropriate to invoke this doctrine where the grantors had clearly
indicated their intent to retain the right to exploit the minerals and
to benefit from that exploitation. 45 The grantors, husband and wife,
had conveyed the fee to their children, "excepting and reserving"
a life estate in the- property and, inter alia, "the gas rentals and/
or royalties" to themselves. The wife leased the gas rights after her
husband's death. At her death, the remaindermen brought an action
against her estate and the gas lessee for trespass and conversion;
the lessee brought an action to enjoin the remaindermen from in-
terfering with its operation of the wells. While the grantors had
clearly expressed their intent to permit the life tenants (themselves)
to lease the minerals, the court could not determine from the deed,
as a matter of law, whether they had intended to allow the life
tenants to bind the remaindermen by any leases. Therefore, the case
was remanded for a determination of that question.
Three years later, a Texas court did find it necessary to apply
the "open mines doctrine.' '46 Testator had executed several mineral
leases on his ranch during his lifetime. His will created a trust of
the ranch and other property for the benefit of his son. The trustee
was given the power to execute mineral leases. The trust was to
terminate when the son reached the age of 35. If, at that time, the
son had a child "born in lawful wedlock," the entire trust corpus
was to be distributed to the son. If, as turned out to be the case,
the son did not have a child when the trust ended, he was to receive
44. Id.
45. Doverspike v. Chambers, 357 Pa. Super. 539, 516 A.2d 392 (1986).
46. McGill v. Johnson, 775 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
[Vol. 92
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all personal property in the trust and only a life estate in the ranch.
The remainder was given to the testator's two sisters or their issue.
Both sisters died before the son reached the age of 35. Only one
of the two was survived by issue.
When the trust ended, the trustee distributed all royalties, rentals,
and bonuses which it had received from mineral leases to the son,
along with the fee in one-half of the ranch and a life estate in the
other one-half. The issue of the testator's sister challenged this dis-
tribution. The court held that the sister who had died without issue
held only a contingent remainder in her one-half of the property.
When that remainder failed to vest in her or in her issue, it passed
to the son, along with a life estate in the other one-half. In applying
the "open mines doctrine," the court concluded that the testator
had intended to give the life tenant-son the benefit of his mineral
leases, and of those made by the trustee. Wells under leases pre-
dating the testator's death were "open mines;" leases by the trustee
were intended for the son's benefit to the extent of his interest in
the property. The trustee had not committed waste by distributing
all lease income to the son when the trust ended.
Another important case was decided by the Kentucky court in
1989.47 The grantor, under an 1897 deed, had conveyed the fee in
certain real estate to his wife for life, subject to a life estate in
himself, and "at the death of [the wife] ... to descend to the heirs
of her body belonging to the said Grantor .... ",48 Grantor and his
wife then sold the minerals by deed. The wife survived her husband
and four of their seven children. She died in 1936. Her surviving
children or their representatives leased the coal on the property and
the lessee began mining in the early 1980's. The successor to the
1903 mineral grantee sought to prevent mining but, for reasons not
in the opinion, an injunction was denied. The suit continued in order
to determine who was entitled to the royalties. The trial court had
held that the wife had received only a life estate and that her children
had received only contingent remainders until her death. The ap-
pellate court reversed, holding that the children's remainders vested
47. East Kentucky Energy Corp. v. Niece, 774 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
48. Id. at 459.
1990]
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as they were born. Because the three children who pre-deceased their
mother left no other heirs, she had inherited their interests at their
respective deaths. As a result, the wife owned three-sevenths of the
fee, including the minerals, when she died. The 1903 mineral deed
severed the minerals and surface estates, passing her three-sevenths
interest to the 1903 grantee. That grantee's successor now holds the
three-sevenths interest as a cotenant with the four children who sur-
vived their mother. The court did not indicate how this will affect
the underlying disputes over the validity of the later lease or the
right to royalties from the mining operation.
2. Cotenants
Concurrent ownership of minerals presents problems similar to
those of present and future interests. 49 May a cotenant who has not
joined in a mineral lease prevent the lessee from mining? The answer
to this question depends upon the jurisdiction in which the minerals
are located. Virginia continues to treat mining which has been au-
thorized by fewer than all cotenants as waste, and any cotenant may
enjoin mining by the other cotenants or their lessees.50 However,
the rule is different in many other states.
51
For example, in Pennsylvania, a lease of surface mining rights
executed by fewer than all of the surface cotenants was discharged
upon sale of the surface estate at a partition sale instituted by the
lessor-cotenants. 2 In a later decision in the same litigation, the court
held that the lessor-cotenants' failure to acquire the property at the
partition sale was not a breach of their covenant of quiet enjoyment
in the lease.53
49. See generally Hurtt & Jordan, Co-Ownership: The Problem It Creates for the Oil and Gas
Producer, 6 E. Mm. L. INsr. ch. 16 (1985).
50. Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 235 Va. 660, 370 S.E.2d 305 (1988).
51. See generally, Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 1368 (1949); Annot., 91 A.L.R. 205 (1934); Annot., 40
A.L.R.2d 1400 (1926).
52. Lichtenfels v. Bridgeview Coal Co., 344 Pa. Super. 257, 496 A.2d 782 (1985).
53. Lichtenfels v. Bridgeview Coal Co., 366 Pa. Super. 304, 531 A.2d 22 (1987). The lessee
had requested the lessor-cotenants to institute the partition proceeding in the expectation that they
would be the successful purchasers, thus eliminating the interest of one cotenant who had held out
for a higher rental.
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The importance of a cotenant's theory for requesting injunctive
relief is illustrated by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal's
decision in Eagle Gas Co. v. Doran & Associates, Inc.54 West Vir-
ginia is one of the minority of jurisdictions which allow one cotenant
to enjoin mineral production by another cotenant as waste.5 5 In Ea-
gle, plaintiff and defendant held separate leases from different co-
tenants of the fee. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from
trespassing against its leasehold. The court upheld the refusal of an
injunction and limited plaintiff to an accounting.56 Relying upon an
earlier decision which did not involve injunctive relief, the court said:
"It is conceptually impossible for tenants-in-common, with a mutual
right to possession of the whole, to trespass against one another.
' 57
It is not clear that this case signals a change in West Virginia law,
however. There are numerous points of distinction between this case
and those West Virginia cases allowing one cotenant to enjoin min-
eral production by another cotenant5 8 This dispute was between two
lessees not between fee owners. Plaintiff's lease had never been de-
livered to it by its lessors, although plaintiff had regularly paid delay
rentals to an agent of the lessors. Defendant was not chargeable
with notice of plaintiff's unrecorded lease because plaintiff had de-
nied having a lease when asked by one of defendant's lessors.
5 9 Most
significantly, plaintiff sued t0 enjoin a trespass, not waste. Had
plaintiff's request for injunction been predicated on a theory of
waste, the decision could have been different.
C. Trespassers-Innocent and Wilful
The early 1980's was not a particularly good period for three
operators who mined minerals, owned by others, without their per-
mission. Determining who owns the minerals in a tract of land can
54. 387 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1989).
55. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Koontz, 113 W. Va. 611, 169 S.E.328 (1933); Law v. Heck Oil
Co., 106 W. Va. 296, 145 S.E. 601 (1928) (recognizes that a different result may apply where pro-
duction is necessary to prevent drainage of estate). See generally I E. Kuntz, Oil and Gas § 5.4 (1987).
56. Eagle Gas, 387 S.E.2d at 103.
57. Id. citing Thaxton v. Beard, 157 W. Va. 381, 201 S.E.2d 298 (1973).
58. Koontz, 113 W. Va. 611, 169 S.E. 328 (1933); Law, 106 W. Va. 296, 145 S.E. 601 (1928).
59. Eagle Gas, 387 S.E.2d at 102.
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be a tricky business. 60 However, as the cases from this period in-
dicate, the penalty for failing to obtain permission from the correct
owner can be high.
When awarding damages, most courts distinguish between "in-
nocent" trespassers, who mine another's minerals by mistake, and
intentional trespassers, who knowingly or recklessly mine without
permission. 61 Where the trespass was intentional, most courts employ
a rule of damages designed to deny the trespasser any profit what-
soever from its wrongful act. The precise calculation of this profit
element differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The distinction ap-
pears to lie in a court's determination of which acts were wrongful.
The wilful trespasser is required to bear the cost of its wrongful
acts, but is entitled to a credit for the cost of acts which were not
wrongful.
In Dethloff v. Zeigler Coal Co.,62 an Illinois mine operator was
ultimately assessed compensatory damages of $3,600,000 for its in-
tentional trespass. After defendant's lease had expired, plaintiffs in-
dicated an interest in negotiating a new lease. Defendant, contending
that the old lease was still in effect, mined and tendered royalties
based upon the expired lease. The supreme court upheld the trial
court's refusal to submit the issue of defendant's status as an in-
nocent or intentional trespasser to the jury. In so doing, the appellate
court held that status is a question of law and not of fact.
That court further ruled that the measure of damages in Illinois
is the value of the coal at the mine mouth less the cost of trans-
porting it there. An intentional trespasser is not entitled to off set
the cost of mining or processing the coal for sale. However, if the
defendant had been an "innocent trespasser," it would have been
entitled to deduct its mining costs as well as the transportation costs
from the coal's value when sold. The court also affirmed the trial
court's refusal to award punitive damages. By denying an intentional
60. See Kotjarapoglus, Curing Title Defects by Litigation, 9 E. Mmn. L. INST. ch. 13 (1988);
Cassidy, Title Defects and Their Cure, 2 E. MiN. L. INST. ch. 20 (1981).
61. See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 380 (1952).
62. 82 Ill. 2d 303, 412 N.E.2d 526 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Zeigler Coal Co. v. Dethloff,
451 U.S. 910 (1981).
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trespasser any benefit from its wrongful act, the measure of damages
itself is punitive 3
In Reynolds v. Pardee & Curtin Lumber Co.,64 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals discussed the distinction between willful
and innocent trespassers and held that the damages available from
each are equal to the mineral's value at the mine mouth. The dif-
ference lies in who must bear the cost of mining and transporting
the mineral, the trespasser or the mineral owner. An intentional
trespasser is liable for the value at the mine mouth without deduction
for the costs of either mining or moving the mineral there. On the
other hand, an innocent trespasser's liability is measured by the value
of the mineral in place. This may be determined by the value at
the mine mouth, less the cost of mining and moving the mineral
there.65 The innocent trespasser does not profit from its wrong, but
it is not penalized by the loss of its out of pocket expanses; the
willful trespasser loses both its profit and its operating expenses. 66
The West Virginia court also indicated that the trespasser's lessor
could be jointly liable with it for the trespass. The court stated that,
if the lessor "had knowledge of or acquiesced in its lessee's trespass
or failed to adequately warn its lessee about [plaintiff's interest], it
can be held jointly accountable for the trespass on a common pur-
pose theory." 67
The West Virginia damage rule differs from that of Illinois by
denying the wilful trespasser recovery for the cost of moving the
coal to the mine mouth. While neither case notes this difference, it
would appear that Illinois views the trespass as ending once the coal
has been severed from the seam. West Virginia treats the wrong as
continuing until the coal reaches the point of shipment from the
mine.
63. 82 Ill. 2d at 413, 412 N.E.2d at 536.
64. 310 S.E.2d 870 (v. Va. 1983).
65. For a thorough discussion of the liability of an innocent trespasser in Kentucky, see Com-
ment, The Good Faith Mineral Trespasser's Reasonable Cost of Production, 5 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y
321 (1988-89).
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A Pennsylvania court adopted a very different measure of dam-
ages for a wilful surface mining trespasser in Smith v. Benjamin
Coal Co. 68 Despite plaintiff's objections, defendant mined under a
lease from a third party which did not include plaintiff's property.
Knowing of plaintiff's ownership claim, defendant did not search
its lessor's title nor make a survey of the area to be mined. Plaintiff
brought this action in equity to enjoin further mining and to recover
damages for coal mined.
The appellate court reversed an award based upon the value of
the coal in place as determined by the royalty rate for similar coal.
According to the court, this measure would not justly compensate
plaintiff for her loss. Instead, she was entitled to damages based
upon three factors: (1) the value of the coal in place; (2) detention
damages for delay in payment; and (3) an amount, "reasonable in
all the circumstances," sufficient to compensate plaintiff for de-
fendant's taking of her incidents of ownership in the coal. Plaintiff's
incidents of ownership included rights to determine when to develop
and sell the coal, with whom to deal, at what rate, and under what
specific terms. The court held that the third element of damages is
to be proven with the "best available evidence," including the amount
of profit which defendant made in mining and selling the coal. 69
Defendant need not disgorge all of its profits from the wrongful
mining. The amount of profit is a factor to be considered in de-
termining the amount of plaintiff's "just compensation."
The Pennsylvania court's damages formula is far less precise than
that applied elsewhere. This formula allows recovery of more than
the royalty, but it gives little guidance as to how much more should
be recovered. It also allows the trespasser to benefit from its wrong-
ful act. The trespasser's profit is only a "factor" in determining
damages. Thus, a wilful trespasser presumably could retain some or
all of its mining costs and its profit. Conversely, the Illinois and
West Virginia decisions state the traditional measure of damages-
the difference between the mineral's value at the mine mouth and
68. 279 Pa. Super. 82, 420 A.2d 754 (1980).
69. Id. at 89, 420 A.2d at 758.
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the cost of mining it.7° This formula denies the trespasser any profit
from its unlawful mining activity although the acts which constitute
that activity may not be uniform.
The Pennsylvania court may have focused its opinion on "just
compensation" because the proceeding was in equity rather than one
for damages. The court did not examine intentional trespasser cases
from other jurisdictions. In 1913, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had refused to award more than value in place for an intentional
deep mining trespass. 71 However, the court in Benjamin distin-
guished that case as limited to deep mines. 72 Although the validity
of this distinction may be open to question, the court's awarding
of more than royalties for a wilful trespass should not be questioned.
Otherwise, the trespasser has little incentive to negotiate with the
mineral owner: it may mine without permission and, after litigation,
pay no more that the going royalty rate plus interest for its use of
the money in the interim.
III. ACQUISITION OF INTERESTs-BusINEss AND MoRALITY
A new standard of morality or commercial ethics is being re-
flected in cases concerning buyers and sellers of mineral properties.
Courts are examining the fairness of business transactions in new
ways. A party who negotiates an advantageous contract will be per-
mitted to retain the benefits of its efforts if it has treated the other
party fairly and in good faith both during the negotiation and per-
formance of the contract. However, a party in a superior negotiating
position, through superior knowledge or access to knowledge con-
cerning the quality and quantity of minerals or concerning access
to facilities necessary for the property's development, is being held
to a higher standard in its treatment of the opposing party. A party
in a superior negotiating position may no longer rely on the pro-
tection of the traditional doctrine of Caveat Emptor. In determining
70. Supra note 61.
71. In Trustees of Kingston v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa. 469, 88 A. 763 (1913), the
court indicated that the value of the coal in place, as measured by its value per acre, if any, or its
royalty value if no acreage value were available, should be the measure of recovery regardless of the
nature of the trespass.
72. Smith v. Benjamin Coal Co., 279 Pa. Super. 82, 88, 420 A.2d 754, 757 (1980).
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the fairness and validity of underlying transactions, courts are be-
ginning to review the ways in which the stronger party uses its
strength.
Perhaps the most notorious of these cases during the 80's in-
volved the dispute between Pennzoil and Texaco over Pennzoil's
frustrated efforts to acquire Getty Oil Co. After Texaco acquired
Getty, Pennzoil recovered a jury verdict against Texaco for ap-
proximately $10.6 billion resulting from Texaco's tortious interfer-
ence with an advantageous business relationship, even though that
relationship never became final.73 Not all of the decisions, addressing
this issue during that decade, brought such a high recovery, but
many reflect the growing judicial requirement that one must deal
fairly with others and not take undue advantage of special knowl-
edge or market power.
This new morality is illustrated by Zimpel v. Trawick.74 In Zim-
pel, defendant purchased 15 mineral acres in Oklahoma from an
elderly woman living in Arkansas at a purchase price of $2,000 an
acre. He then sold that property, just three weeks later, for $3,300
an acre. At the time of the original purchase, defendant knew that
a potentially productive well had been drilled on neighboring land.
Information about the well was being closely guarded by its op-
erators; however, defendant had learned of test results from his
partner's father-in-law, who knew some people operating the drilling
rig. Defendant discussed purchase of acreage with the elderly own-
er's brother, who also lived in Arkansas and also owned mineral
acreage in the vicinity, and with the owner herself on several oc-
casions. During these negotiations, defendant never revealed any in-
formation about the new well and, in fact, indicated to both the
seller and her brother that the Oklahoma oil and gas business was
in poor condition.
73. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987), writ ref'd n.r.e.
(affirming judgment as to actual damages and ordering remittitur to reduce punitive damages from
$3,000,000,000 to $1,000,000,000); 748 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1988) (accepting parties' settlement
agreement and dismissing action). A list of the other citations to this dispute would be almost as
long as this article. An interesting description of the litigation can be found in Baron & Baron, The
Pennzoil-Texaco Dispute: An Independent Analysis, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 253 (1986).
74. 679 F. Supp. 1502 (W.D. Ark. 1988).
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When the ailing woman agreed to sell, the defendant immediately
drove 300 miles to her home in order to close the deal. The parties
met on her front porch. She was attached to an oxygen tank, and
she talked at length of her desire to die debt free. Shortly after the
sale, she did die and her personal representative brought this action
in fraud. The court awarded $19,500 in compensatory damages,
measured by the difference between the purchase price and the
acreage's fair market value as determined by its resale price, and
$20,000 in punitive damages. As to the punitive damages, the court
said that "[d]efendant's conduct in this case was nothing short of
outrageous." 7
5
The significance of this case lies in the court's conclusion that,
because the parties were not on equal footing, the defendant had
a duty to disclose secret information to her or be found guilty of
misrepresenting the property's value.76 The court's sympathies for
the seller are obvious and one probably should not read too much
into the case. However, this case is noteworthy because much earlier
the Arkansas Supreme Court had denied relief to equally unso-
phisticated sellers in an action against an equally informed and
knowledgeable buyer.77
On the other hand, a Michigan court refused to impose a duty
to disclose knowledge of the value of mineral land on a prospective
lessee in Zaschak v. Traverse Corp.78 The facts are not at all clear
from the court's opinion. Plaintiff sold the mineral rights under his
land to the defendant. During the negotiations, plaintiff asked one
of defendant's land agents about exploratory oil and gas activity in
the vicinity. The agent, who possessed a graduate degree in geology
75. Id. at 1512-13.
76. The opinion stated:
The court is firmly convinced that the evidence abundantly shows that ... [defendants],
through the use of superior knowledge not reasonably within the reach of ... [the seller],
and through the failure to disclose facts they had knowledge and a duty to disclose, fraud-
ulently caused her to convey her mineral interest to the defendants for substantially less
than fair market value.
Id. at 1511. Cf. Barnhill & Enns, Choosing Between an Honest Bargain and No Bargain: Information
Disclosure to Potential Lessors, 2 E. MN. L. INST. ch. 1 (1981) and authorities therein cited.
77. Storthz v. Arnold, 74 Ark. 68, 84 S.W. 1036 (1905). This case is not cited in Zimpel.
78. 123 Mich. App. 126, 333 N.W.2d 191 (1983).
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and, according to the court, "undoubtedly had information re-
garding oil and gas exploration in the area of plaintiffs' land...,"19
stated that he was unaware of any exploration activity, while in fact,
activity of that type was taking place in the area at that time. Al-
though the lessee paid plaintiff a current fair price for his minerals,
the minerals either later became or were later determined to be worth
substantially more than the purchase price. The court sustained sum-
mary judgment for the defendants based on plaintiff's failure to
plead sufficient facts to support an action of fraud. Indicating that
evidence of fraud would first require a duty of disclosure, the court
said: "Michigan courts have not yet recognized a duty on the part
of a vendee to disclose facts relevant to the value of real estate in
question even when specifically asked. We decline to promulgate
such a duty on the facts of this case."80
One should not take too much comfort from Zaschak. First, the
case decided only that the facts as pleaded did not state a cause of
action. The opinion failed to indicate what those facts were. Second,
the opinion does not indicate the degree of knowledge which could
be imputed to the plaintiff, nor does it indicate the parties' relative
bargaining power. The court admitted that the defendant's agent
"could have concealed material facts from plaintiff,"'" not that he
did, in fact, do so. Finally, there were two other defendants which
settled with the plaintiff, perhaps because they recognized the pos-
sibility of recovery with adequate pleadings.
Canada had its own Pennzoil case during this era, International
Corona Resources Ltd. v. LAC Minerals Ltd.82 The Supreme Court
of Canada affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust on certain
gold mining lands and a mine owned by LAC Minerals Ltd. (LAC).
The properties at issue had been acquired after International Corona
Resources Ltd. (Corona) had initiated discussions with LAC which
79. Id. at 129, 333 N.W.2d at 192.
80. Id. at 128, 333 N.W.2d at 192.
81. Id. at 128, 333 N.W.2d at 191.
82. 101 Nat. Rptr. 239 (S. Ct. Canada 1989). For a full discussion of the lower court decisions
and their implications for mining ventures in the United States, see Erisman & McCarthy, International
Corona Resources Corp. v. LAC Minerals, Ltd.: Unauthorized Use of Trade Secrets Acquired During
Failed Negotiations, 9 E. MN. L. INST. ch. 1 (1988).
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Corona hoped would lead to some kind of joint development ar-
rangement of its mineral lands. Corona was a small company with-
out access to the large amounts of capital necessary for development
of the property. LAC was a large mining concern. Corona revealed
various items of information related to the potential development
value of its lands and of neighboring lands. At no time did Corona
formally declare that this information was being disclosed in con-
fidence. Based on the information from Corona, LAC acquired land
adjoining Corona's and opened its own mine.
The trial court had imposed the constructive trust because it found
that LAC owed Corona a fiduciary duty not to profit at Corona's
expense from the information disclosed. Although a majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada found that there was no fiduciary re-
lationship between the two companies, the court unanimously upheld
the constructive trust on the different ground of breach of confi-
dence. To show an actionable breach of confidence, according to
the court, one must show: (1) that confidential information was
disclosed, (2) that it was disclosed under circumstances which give
rise to a duty of confidentiality, and (3) that the information was
misused by the party to whom it was disclosed.
A duty of confidence was found even though Corona, in an
effort to attract investors, had made some of the information public
before to its discussions with LAC. Corona never expressly told
LAC's representatives that non-public information was being dis-
closed in confidence. Nonetheless, the court concluded that LAC
had a duty not to use the information to Corona's detriment because
a "reasonable person" would have realized that the information was
being disclosed in confidence. This standard appears to turn the issue
of confidentiality into a question of fact and to permit inference of
the duty even in the absence of any effort by the disclosing party
to protect the confidential nature of its information.
Zimpel and Corona both involve parties with unequal bargaining
power. One was the archetypical, terminally ill, little old lady; the
other a going business concern with a substantial professional staff.
Yet each court believed that the particular plaintiff had been dealt
with unfairly by its respective defendant. Neither court hesitated to
provide substantial relief for the weaker, injured party. Zimpel may
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be nothing more than a case of garden variety fraud, 83 but Corona
imposed liability where, arguably, none had existed before. At least
it appears to the be the first case to employ the "reasonable person"
test to create a duty of confidentiality. Taken together, these cases
illustrate a trend in which courts will hold parties with superior
knowledge, bargaining power, or access to information to a higher
duty to prevent that party from benefitting from its advantageous
position at the other party's expense. 84
The difference between "unfair advantage" and actual fraud is
often only a matter of degree or of characterization. Where fraud
or misrepresentation is present in the transaction, courts are gen-
erally willing to award substantial damages to the injured party."
The adoption of the federal Racketeering Influence & Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act 86 .(RICO), with its provisions for treble damages,
makes successful fraud claims very expensive for the defendants.
The Supreme Court has indicated that RICO is to be liberally applied
in civil fraud cases.87 Thus, a party to negotiations or an agreement
who has superior information or other bargaining power should take
particular care to deal fairly, both in fact and in appearance, with
the weaker party.
Where the parties stand on a more equal footing and are able
to negotiate freely, courts during the 80's continued to hold them
83. See also Arkel Land Co. v. Cagle, 445 So. 2d 858 (Ala. 1983) (lessor with only fifth grade
education was advised by land agent that he need not retain an attorney; attorney who drafted lease
found to be agent of lessee, not lessor, made material misrepresentation as to the property covered
by the lease); Johnson v. Brewer, 427 So. 2d 118 (Miss. 1983) (lessee's agent made material misrep-
resentation to 80 year old lessor as to reason for top lease and paid "grossly inadequate" consid-
eration). Note that each of these lessors admitted that they had not read the leases which they signed,
but neither defendant was relieved of liability for its fraud.
84. See also Fox, Rights of a Lessor in Payments Received by a Producer from "Buydouns"
or "Buyouts" of Long-term Contracts, 10 E. MiN. L. IN sT. ch. 1 (1989). (Discussing the suggestion
of a higher standard owed by a mineral lessee to its lessor under certain circumstances).
85. E.g., Knop v. McMahan, 872 F.2d 1132 (3rd Cir. 1989). See also United States v. Tabor
Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied 483 U.S. 1005 (1987) (finding in-
tentional fraud under the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, PA. STAT. ANN, §§
351 - 363 (Purdon 1954), in a management leveraged buyout of a coal company).
86. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 - 1968 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See generally, Getty, The Civil RICO-
A New Weapon for Use in Securities and Commercial Fraud Cases, 5 E. Mni. L. IN sT. ch. 2 (1984).
87. H.J. Inc., 109 S.Ct. 2893 (1989). For an application of H.J. Inc. to a lease of coal lands
and sale of mining equipment, see Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989).
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to their agreements even when those agreements turned out to be
disadvantageous. For example, in Esplanade Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Tem-
pleton Energy Income Corp.,88 the buyer of certain oil producing
properties refused to close when the price of oil dropped from $28.30
to $20.30 per barrel. The parties had entered into a letter agreement
contemplating negotiation of a "mutually definitive purchase agree-
ment" which was never executed. The letter agreement provided that
the buyer's duty to close was subject to a condition that "[t]here
shall be no adverse material change to the [p]roperties... prior to
[c]losing." The Fifth Circuit held that this language referred to ma-
terial changes in the seller's title, not to changes in the wells' value.
The court also found that the parties' failure to execute the purchase
agreement or to satisfy certain other conditions in the letter agree-
ment did not cause the buyer's refusal to perform. Therefore, the
buyer was liable in damages for failure to perform its contract.
Several other decisions stressed the equal bargaining power of
the parties in holding them to their agreements. An integration clause
in a contract of assignment was held to negate the existence of an
implied duty to mine, even though part of the consideration for the
assignment was a profit participation from development.8 9 Similarly,
an integration clause in a mineral lease operated to bar evidence of
oral representations as to coal quality or the depth of overburden
made during preliminary negotiations. 90 A provision in an agreement
of sale for coal properties and equipment that the buyer would ac-
cept the properties "as is" barred recovery for treatment costs of
an acid mine discharge discovered after the sale.9' The facts indicated
88. 889 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1989).
89. Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 756 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1985),
rev'd 865 F.2d 761 (6th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied 877 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1989). Note that the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case for a determination as to whether an implied duty to mine might found
in some of the underlying leases. For more on the implied duty to mine during the 1980's, see Brooks
v. Freeport Kaolin Co., 253 Ga. 678, 324 S.E.2d 170 (1985); Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 732
P.2d 679 (Idaho App. Ct. 1986); Dethloff v. Zeigler Coal Co., 82 Ill. 2d 393, 45 Ill. Dec. 175, 412
N.E.2d 526 (1980); Ionno v. Glen-Gery Corp., 2 Ohio St. 3d 131, 443 N.E.2d 504 (1983); Bennett
v. Hebner, 56 Or. App. 770, 643 P.2d 393 (1982), review denied, 293 Or. 294, 650 P.2d 927; Hutchison
v. Sunbeam Coal Co., 513 Pa. 192, 519 A.2d 385 (1986); Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Cleghorn,
623 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1981); see Fox & Hackett, The Implied Obligation to Mine, 7 E. MIN. L. INsT.
ch. 4 (1986).
90. Douglas v. Benson, 294 Pa. Super. 119, 439 A.2d 779 (1982).
91. PBS Coals Inc. v. Burnham Coal Co., 384 Pa. Super. 323, 558 A.2d 562 (1989).
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that neither party knew about discharge at the time of contracting.
The court indicated that, where the parties to the contract are "sea-
soned businessmen," it would not grant relief which might otherwise
be available to the "inexperienced consumer." 92
Taken together, these cases indicate an increased judicial will-
ingness to consider, as a threshold matter, the relative bargaining
strength of the parties to any agreement. Where their strength is
sufficiently disproportionate, a court will examine the fairness of
the weaker party's treatment by the stronger party. If that treatment
does not meet the court's standard of fairness, relief will be avail-
able. Where the court is satisfied that the parties' relative bargaining
strengths, although not necessarily equal, were not too dispropor-
tionate, the parties will be held to their bargain.
IV. OwRSHm-How LONG CAN IT LAST?
One interesting aspect of mineral law is the ability to separate
ownership of mineral rights from the remainder of the estate, usually
erroneously called the "surface estate." Unless limited by specific
language in the severance instrument, a mineral estate will last as
long as it contains recoverable minerals. 93 Once the minerals have
been exhausted, the mineral owner's rights and duties end unless
the parties have agreed otherwise.94 Furthermore, the mineral estate,
at least where it is a leasehold rather than a freehold, may be lost
by abandonment. 95  0
This separation of ownership creates a tension between the sur-
face and mineral estate owners which seems to have become par-
ticularly frustrating to surface owners during the past ten years. Lack
92. Id. at 328, 558 A.2d at 564.
93. See cases cited, supra notes 37-38.
94. Compare Olbum v. Old Home Manor, Inc., 313 Pa. Super. 99, 459 A.2d 757 (1983) (ex-
haustion of minerals ends lessee's estate and duty to pay minimum royalties even though term has
not yet ended) with Wiggins v. Warrior River Coal Co., 696 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1983) (lease terms
required continued payment of minimum royalties after exhaustion of recoverable minerals).
95. E.g., Leet v. Vinglas, 366 Pa. Super. 294, 531 A.2d 17 (1987). A freehold estate may not
terminate by abandonment; Simonton, Abandonment of Interests in Land, 25 ILL. L.J. 261 (1930).
For an interesting case using "abandonment" in a different context, see Universal Minerals, Inc. v.
C. A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98 (3rd Cir. 1981) (whether title to coal waste pile abandoned by
operator is a mixed question of law and fact).
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of ownership means that the surface owner lacks control over when
the minerals will be developed, how they will be developed, and how
greatly their development will interfere with activities on the surface
estate.
In the eastern states, mineral interests were often severed from
surface interests during the Nineteenth Century. Thus, many of these
interests are now more than 100 years old. Even interests severed
around the time of World War II are now fifty years old. A majority
of the cases discussed in this article involve severances which pre-
date World War II. Despite considerable changes in surface use since
these severances occurred, the minerals frequently remain unmined.
There are many reasons why the minerals may not have been
mined. Some minerals go unmined as a result of the division of
ownership which seems inevitable when property interests pass from
generation to generation. Others go unmined when their corporate
owners quietly go out of business without formal dissolution or
bankruptcy proceedings.96 In still other cases, the minerals are being
held as reserves, either against present commitments for future pro-
duction or strictly as inventory for production or sale when market
conditions warrant it. Finally, some mineral deposits cannot be ec-
onomically developed under present market conditions or with cur-
rent technology, but may be developed with changed conditions.
Often non-production of a particular mineral property is due to a
combination of these reasons.
The more difficult it becomes to locate the owner of a severed
mineral interest, the less likely it is that someone with an interest
in the surface will try to do so. Indeed, a court may even excuse
failure to search for the mineral owner because of the expense and
difficulty of doing so. The Fifth Circuit recently held that a severed
mineral interest was discharged by a mortgage foreclosure sale of
the surface estate even though the mortgagee made no attempt, other
than general advertisement of the sale, to notify the mineral lessee
of the foreclosure.9 7 The court ruled that due process did not require
96. See Beck, Obtaining "Good" Title from the Inactive or Terminated Corporation, 2 E. MIN.
L. INST. ch. 19 (1981).
97. Davis Oil Co. v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 331 (1989).
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actual notice to the mineral interest because of the complexity of
searching mineral titles.98 Surface development proceeds without re-
gard for the unknown or inactive mineral owner. Later, when it
becomes economically or technologically feasible to develop the min-
erals, conflicts arise between the surface owner and mineral owner.
A typical scenario goes as follows. The severance of the two
estates occurred decades ago. Memories of that transfer have dimmed.
Title searchers concerned with the surface estate title fail to look
for severances. Instead, they limit their abstracts, opinions, and in-
surance polices to title to the surface estate alone. When the mineral
interest becomes valuable enough to merit development, new op-
erators approach the surface owner for leases or deeds. At that time,
the surface owner tries to establish title to the minerals despite the
ancient severance. The 1980's did not demonstrate any weakening
in the traditional principles for determining who owns the minerals
beneath a particular tract of land. That era did, however, see new
limitations on how long separate ownership, once established, may
continue without development.
A. Termination for Non-Development or Improper Development
In several cases lessors or surface owners attempted to terminate
mineral leases either because the minerals had not been developed
for some time or because the mineral operator had breached some
affirmative obligation in its lease. As a general proposition, courts
were not sympathetic to a lessor-plaintiff who tried to terminate the
lease by forfeiture.
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized that a mineral lessee had
breached its implied duty to mine by failing to develop the property
98. In Davis, the court stated:
Given the complexity of land title records in some jurisdictions, the "reasonableness" con-
straint of Mullane [v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)] must limit
the broad language of Mennonite [Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)]. See
[Tulsa Professional Collection Services v.] Pope, [485 U.S. 478 (1985),] 108 S.Ct. at 1344.
Accordingly, the reasonableness of constructive notice in a particular case may turn on the
nature of the property interest at stake and the relative ease or difficulty of identifying
such interest holders from the land records and also on the existence of alternative means
of insuring the receipt of notice.
873 F.2d at 790.
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for seventeen years. 99 Nevertheless, the court denied the lessor's re-
quested forfeiture. Forfeiture for failure to mine would be allowed
"when necessary to do justice to the parties." 1°° The lessor had the
burden of proving that damages would not be an adequate remedy.
As the lessor had introduced no evidence of damages sustained from
the breach, justice did not require a forfeiture here.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a similar case, held that
no duty to mine would be implied in a lease providing for an annual
minimum advance royalties to the lessor. 101 In Pennsylvania, "min-
imum annual royalties are in the nature of liquidated damages for
the lessee's failure to mine."' 1 2 The lessor could not terminate the
lease for lessee's failure to mine while these royalties were being
paid. 103
In West Virginia, a lessor unsuccessfully sought to obtain a for-
feiture of -a coal mining lease for the lessee's breach of various
express covenants as provided in the lease. °4 The trial court had
awarded the lessor $10,000,000 in damages for various breaches and
had decreed the lease forfeited. On appeal, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court affirmed the award of damages but reversed as to the
forfeiture. Forfeiture would have given the lessor its damages plus
improvements made by the lessee worth over $6,000,000. The court
found that the lessor had been adequately compensated in damages
for its losses from the breaches. Therefore, it would be inequitable
to allow a forfeiture as well. Additionally, the court found forfeiture
99. lonno v. Glen-Gery Corp., 2 Ohio St. 3d 131, 443 N.E.2d 504 (1983).
100. Id. at 135, 443 N.E.2d at 508.
101. Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. 192, 202, 519 A.2d 385, 388-89 (1986), aff'g
349 Pa. Super. 625, 503 A.2d 54, and rev'g Frenchak v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 344 Pa. Super. 37,
495 A.2d 1385 (1985).
102. 513 Pa. at 197, 519 A.2d at 388-89, citing, inter alia, Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Allison
Engineering Co., 279 Pa. Super. 432, 447, 421 A.2d 281, 284 (1980) ("minimum royalties" or "ad-
vance royalties" are in the nature of rent and not recoupable from production unless specifically so
provided in lease.). And see In re Estate of Fike, 385 Pa. Super. 627, 561 A.2d 1268 (1989) (dis-
tinguishing "minimum tonnage royalties" and "advance royalties" differently; lease provided for
recoupment of "advance royalties.").
103. The court agreed with the lower court that the lease term had expired, but not because of
non-development. 513 Pa. at 203, 519 A.2d at 390-91.
104. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co., 288 S.E.2d 139 (f. Va. 1982), (discussed with
lonno in Artimez, Forfeiture: General State of the Law and Movement to Further Confine Its Ap-
plication in the Coal Lease, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 1039 (1984)).
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to be unavailable because the forfeiture provision in the lease did
not specify which defaults could result in this severe remedy. Finally,
the court ruled, the lessor had waived its right to forfeiture by not
acting sooner.
A lessee was relieved of forfeiture by a Pennsylvania court where
he failed to begin mining within the period required by the lease. 05
The lease provided for automatic termination if mining did not begin
within one year after its execution. The state regulatory agency had
not issued a mining permit at the end of that one year period. The
lessee had acted promptly and in good faith to obtain the permit.
Because the delay was due solely to the government agency and
because the lessee had at all times acted in good faith, the court
refused to enforce the termination provision.
A successor to a lessor, who, under the provisions of the lease,
was permitted to terminate a lease, was also required to refund a
portion of the advance royalties paid when the lease was executed.10 6
The lease permitted the lessor to terminate for non-production under
certain circumstances. It also required the lessor to refund part of
the advance royalty payment upon termination. The lessor sold the
property to plaintiff who invoked the termination clause but refused
to repay any royalties. The Illinois court held that both the pro-
vision's authority as to termination and the promise to refund roy-
alties were covenants running with the lessor's estate. Therefore, the
lessor's successor was entitled to the benefit of the termination pro-
vision and was bound by the refund requirement. 0 7
These cases indicate that courts will allow premature termination
of a mineral lease only in unusual circumstances. The lessor must
act timely in order to assert forfeiture, allege an actual default per-
mitting termination, 08 and be prepared to demonstrate that damages
105. Williams v. Vessley, 290 Pa. Super. 192, 434 A.2d 196 (1981).
106. McAnelly v. Graves, 126 I11. App.3d 528, 467 N.E.2d 337 (1984).
107. For cases holding that deed covenants regarding minerals did not run to successors of the
promisee, see Union ExpI. Partners, Ltd. v. Amsouth Bank, 718 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Miss. 1989)
(promise to pay grantee one-half of royalties from mineral production) and Bisbee v. Spacht, 125
A.D.2d 982, 510 N.Y.S. 2d 378 (1986) (mortgagee's promise to convey one-half of mineral rights to
mortgagee on satisfaction of mortgage).
108. Dunn v. United Sierra Corp., 612 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (lessee not in default
for failure to pay royalties where payment made in good faith but amount due was in dispute.).
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will not be adequate compensation for the lessee's defaults. While
courts have differed in allocating the burden of proof on the in-
adequacy of damages, 10 as a general principle, damages are to be
preferred to forfeiture. The lessee's good faith efforts to meet lease
conditions can be sufficient to prevent termination where the default
was due to governmental conduct beyond the lessee's control.
B. Adverse Possession of Minerals
Adverse possession is a common theory under which surface
owners assert ownership of severed mineral interests. Unfortunately
these claims are rarely successful. To acquire title to a severed min-
eral estate by adverse possession at common law, one must actually
open a mine or well into the minerals and then operate it openly,
continuously, hostily, and exclusively for the period allowed by the
statute of limitations for actions to recover possession of land.110
Thus, where an estate in one-half the minerals had been severed by
an unrecorded deed, one who acquired title to the surface by adverse
possession also acquired title to the one-half of the minerals not
severed. However, the adverse possessor did not acquire title to the
severed one-half.' Because the adverse possessor had never at-
tempted to develop the minerals, the grantee's interest under the
unrecorded deed was never divested.
An interesting twist on the adverse possession theme appears in
a Tennessee case where the mineral lessee occupied a portion of the
surface for non-mining purposes and paid taxes on it for longer
than the statutory period.12 The court held that the lessee had ac-
quired title to this land by adverse possession. Thus, while mineral
owners need not fear loss of their estates by adverse possession until
109. Artimez, supra note 98, at 1051-56.
110. E.g., Taylor v. Scott, 285 Ark. 102, 685 S.W.2d 160 (1985); East Kentucky Energy Corp.
v. Niece, 774 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (sporadic acts of mining for own use not acts of
adverse possession); Brockman v. Jones, 610 S.W.2d 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (note effect of KY.
REV. STAT. § 381.430 (Banks-Baldwin 1989) making surface owner trustee of minerals for benefit of
mineral owner). And see Nevling v. Natoli, 290 Pa. Super. 174, 434 A.2d 187 (1981). See generally,
Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 124 (1954).
111. Boshwell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89 (Ala. 1982) (one-half of minerals severed by deed in 1937;
title to surface and unsevered portion of minerals acquired by adverse possession in 1953.).
112. Hughes v. Cowan Stone Co., 766 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
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the adverse possessor actively exploits the minerals, surface owners
may not sit idly while the mineral estate exercises rights in the surface
not granted it in the severance.
C. Dormant Mineral Statutes
The common law rules with regard to the termination of a sev-
ered mineral estate by forfeiture and adverse possession, as well as
the state recording statutes' protection of duly recorded property
interests, operate to protect the mineral owner at the expense of the
surface owner."' These same protections can make it as risky to
develop the mineral estate without consolidating ownership as to
develop the surface without regard to the mineral estate. 4
As a response to the recording statutes' efficiency and the im-
pediments to surface development from dormant mineral interests,
several states have adopted statutes tailored specifically to limiting
and eliminating dormant mineral interests. These statutes take one
of three basic forms: "use it or lose it," "root of title," and "catch
all." All three forms impose a burden on severed mineral owners
to take affirmative action to preserve their interest and to continue
to take action, at least periodically, in the future. Each will be dis-
cussed in turn.
The first statutory approach in limiting dormant mineral interests
is the "use it or lose it" statute. These statues require the mineral
owner to develop or make some other "use" of the minerals. Per-
missible alternative "uses" are often defined in the statue as paying
taxes in the mineral estate, paying rentals or royalties, or periodically
recording in the land title records a statement that the owner intends
to preserve its claim." 5 Failure to preserve the interest results in its
113. See generally, Fox, Clearing Titles by Statute after Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 3 E. MIN. L.
INST. ch. 25 (1983).
114. See Smith, Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil and Gas Lands Burdened with
Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 TEx. L. REv. 129 (1964).
115. The leading example of this form is the Indiana Dormant Mineral Mine Act, IND. CODE
ArNN. §§ 32-5-11-1 to -8 (Bums 1979). The statutory scheme is analyzed and discussed at length in
Polston, Legislation, Existing and Proposed, Concerning Marketability of Mineral Titles, 7 LAD &
WATER L. REv. 73 (1974).
[Vol. 92
30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/2
MINING LAW IN THE 1980's
loss. The interest either vests in the surface owner,116 the owner of
the interest from which it was created," 7 or the state."8
During the late 1970's and early 1980's, some of these statutes
were held to run afoul of constitutional protections of private
property'19 while others were found to meet these same require-
ments.' 20 However, federal constitutional issues were resolved fa-
vorably to the "use it or lose it" type of statute in Texaco, Inc. v.
Short.'21 Since that decision, a number of states have adopted sim-
ilarly constructed statutes. 22 An Indiana court has held that the act
of leasing a severed mineral interest is not a sufficient "use" within
such a statute.'2 Failure to make any statutorily defined "use" in
Indiana may result in automatic lapse of the mineral interest without
any action by the surface owner.2'
The second statutory approach used by some states to rectify
dormant mineral interests subjects severed mineral interests to the
state's marketable title statute.'2 To oversimplify, an owner's title
is established by a chain of record title from the present back to
an instrument known as the "root of title," recorded before a given
date. Only claims reflected in the "root," or appearing of current
116. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-228 (1988).
117. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 (Burns 1979).
118. Minn. Stat. Ann, §§ 95.52-93.58 (West Supp. 1990).
119. Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980); Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835,
272 N.W.2d 768 (1978) (unconstitutional in so far as applied to mineral interest existing when adopted);
Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed sub. nom Prest v. Herbst (1989),
444 U.S. 804; Chicago, & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pederson, 80 Wis. 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).
120. Short v. Texaco, Inc., 273 Ind. 518, 406 N.E.2d 625 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Texaco, Inc.
v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982); Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal
dismissed, 455 U.S. 901 (1982).
121. 454 U.S. 516 (1982). See generally, Fox, supra note 107; Note, Retroactive Land Statutes-
Indiana's Dormant Mineral Act Declared Constitutional, 85 W. VA. L. Rnv. 783 (1983).
122. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96 1/2 para. 9201 (1983); Ky. REv. STAT. § 353.460 (Banks-
Baldwin 1989); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.56 (Page Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-108
(Supp. 1988).
123. Kirby v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. App. 1984); McCoy v. Richards, 623
F. Supp. 1300 (D.C. Ind. 1984).
124. McCoy, 623 F. Supp. 1300. See also Polston, Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Law,
6 E. MN. L. INsT. ch. 19, § 19.04[4] (1985).
125. For a description of this approach, see Fox, supra note 107 at § 25.06 [1] (1982). For an
examination of the shortcomings of the approach, see Townsend, The Model Dormant Mineral In-
terests Act: Limited Practicability, 8 E. MN. L. INsT. ch. 20 (1987).
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owner's record chain of title since the "root" remain valid. Claims
predating the "root" may be preserved by "use" or by re-recording
within the statutory period. Otherwise, they are lost. Even a fraud-
ulent deed may become a valid "root of title" and cut off claims.1 26
Where the surface owner's "root" indicates an outstanding mineral
interest, the mineral interest is preserved, 27 at least until that in-
strument no longer serves as the root of title to the surface.
Statutes in the third or "catch all" category apply a variety of
approaches to terminate dormant mineral interests. A Georgia stat-
ute gives the surface owner "a presumption" of title in the mineral
interest by "adverse possession" where the minerals have not been
worked and taxes on the interest have not been paid for a period
of seven years after the severance and seven years prior to the surface
owner's filing a claim of title.'2 Although the Georgia Supreme Court
held that the statute could not apply retroactively to interests created
before its adoption,129 that court later indicated that any prior min-
eral interest will be lost if the seven year periods have run after the
statute was adopted.130 A mineral owner was permitted to preserve
its estate by paying only part of its real estate tax liability three
days before the surface owner filed his claim.' 3' The Eleventh Circuit
recognized that "adverse possession" was a misnomer but not fatal
to the statute's constitutionality; the statute was valid as a mineral
lapse act under Short.3 2
Virginia is the only state which has held its mineral lapse statute
to be unconstitutional after Short was handed down. 33 The Virginia
126. Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 236 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970).
127. South Florida Water Management District v. Muroff, 508 So. 2d 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (reservation in deed of record can be "root of title" for retained mineral interest); Minnich v.
Guernsey Savings & Loan Co., 36 Ohio App. 3d 54, 521 N.E.2d 489 (1987) (where neither surface
or mineral estate can show "root" free of other's claim, title act does not apply).
128. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168 (Michie Supp. 1989).
129. Nelson v. Bloodworth, 238 Ga. 264, 232 S.E.2d 547 (1977).
130. Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580, 308 S.E.2d 170 (1983).
131. ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Hack, 254 Ga. 324, 328 S.E.2d 542 (1984).
132. Mixon v. One Newco, Inc., 863 F.2d 846 (lth Cir. 1989). Other cases under the Georgia
statute include: Hinson v. Loper, 251 Ga. 239, 304 S.E.2d 722 (1983) (mineral rights lost by nonuse
plus nonpayment of taxes, not by adverse possession); Larkin v. Laster, 254 Ga. 716, 334 S.E.2d
158 (1985) (only owner of surface estate at time of lapse, or a successor, may invoke Act before
taxes paid by mineral owner); and Milner v. Bivens, 255 Ga. 49, 335 S.E.2d 288 (1985).
133. Riddleberger v. Chesapeake W. Ry., 229 Va. 213, 327 S.E.2d 663 (1985).
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statute creates a presumption that no recoverable minerals exist un-
der a surface tract if mineral development has not taken place for
thirty-five years. 34 The presumption, however, only applied in coun-
ties of certain population sizes west of the Blue Ridge Mountains
and not in other counties west of those mountains. The Virginia
Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because
a county's population has no rational relationship to the presence
or absence of minerals under the surface. To that extent, the statute
bore no reasonable relationship to its intended purpose and was
arbitrary.
Generally, the 80's were a favorable period for mineral lapse
statutes, whatever form they took. Legislatures and courts were sym-
pathetic to surface owners whose plans were impeded by long unused
mineral interests. These statutes make it much easier for the surface
owner to eliminate outstanding title claims, develop the surface with-
out regard to mineral claims, or develop the minerals when the ex-
isting owner is unwilling to do so. The rather wide-spread adoption
of these statutes reflects the increasing tension between surface and
mineral interests which became a hallmark of the 80's.
V. MINING RIGHTS-SURFACE USE AND SURFACE DAMAGES
Mineral ownership has no value unless one can remove the min-
eral from the earth, process it, sell it, or consume it. For this reason,
the mineral estate has a right, easement, or servitude for use of the
surface estate in order to remove the minerals. 135 Analogous to the
law of easements and servitudes, the mineral estate is referred to as
the "dominant estate" and the surface estate as the "servient es-
tate." The mineral estate has been permitted to diminish the value
of the surface, or to interfere with its use by the surface owner, so
long as those actions are reasonably necessary to recover the min-
erals. Even where the severance expressly creates certain surface rights
134. VA. CODE § 55.164 (1950).
135. See generally Zillnan & Tyler, The Common Law of Access and Surface Use in Mining,
1 J. MiN. L. & PoL'Y 267 (1985-1986).
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in the mineral estate, additional rights will be implied if they are
"reasonably necessary for exploration and development." 36
Several themes appear in the 80's litigation over mining rights.
The passage of time, changes in mining technology, increased ju-
dicial sensitivity to the environmental effects of mineral develop-
ment, the adoption of federal and state environmental statutes, and
increasing judicial sympathies for surface owners' ability to make
productive use of their land have influenced court determinations
concerning the extent of private mining rights granted years ago.
These influences have generally, although not always, served to limit
both the mineral estate's express and implied rights to affect the
surface estate adversely.
The time element often plays an important role in these disputes.
The original severance may have occurred decades, or as much as
a century, earlier. Mining methods have changed; surface activities
have changed. What may have seemed reasonable to a surface owner
when John C.C. Mayo was buying coal lands under his "broad form
deeds" in the hills of Nineteenth Century Kentucky may no longer
be acceptable to the developer of a shopping center, 37 residential
subdivision, 3 8 or automobile assembly plant. Even farming in the
80's has changed, often requiring substantial capital investment in
buildings, equipment, drainage facilities, and water supply. These
conflicting expectations between mining interests and surface use
interests have fueled new judicial approaches to old mining rights
problems.
Mining rights litigation in the 80's began in West Virginia with
some very traditional problems of deed interpretation. 39 By the end
of this period, the same court was making some disturbing sugges-
136. 2 Williams & Meyers, LAw oF Oi. & GAs § 218.7 (1989). See also Note, Disturbing Surface
Rights: What Does "Reasonably Necessary" Mean in West Virginia? 85 W. VA. L. Rnv. 817 (1983).
137. See Eastwood Lands, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 417 So. 2d 164 (Ala. 1982) (shopping center
developer not entitled to enjoin mining which might cause damage to surface because of waiver of
support in severance deed; waiver not against public policy.).
138. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (duty to support
surface in natural state determined as of time coal removed, not as of severance of coal and surface).
139. See infra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
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tions about the effect of federal and state environmental legislation
on private rights and on liability waivers in earlier severances. 140
Similar sentiments have been expressed by other courts. 141 During
this era, the last two eastern coal mining states adopted limitations
on the extent to which severances authorized surface mining by the
mineral estate. However, they did so on very different bases and
with very different consequences.
142
It is too early to say with certainty that the trend toward limiting
the scope of express and implied mining rights will continue. The
pace of change in the common law is often very slow. However,
the seeds have been planted by the judicial opinions written by courts
of influential mining states. These opinions cannot be ignored by
the mineral practitioner. The following cases are illustrative of pres-
ent judicial tendencies.
A. Mining Rights and Changing Technology
1. In General
In 1980, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed
the present effect of mining rights which had been reserved in an
1890 severance. 43 These reserved mining rights expressly included
the right to use the surface for "telephone and telegraph lines" and
"all proper and reasonable rights and privileges for ventilating and
draining the mines." The question arose as to whether the deed also
impliedly permitted an electric transmission line on the surface to
power mine ventilation equipment? A divided court held that the
scope of implied mining rights, in contrast to express rights, should
be determined by balancing the necessity for the claimed right against
the burdens it imposes on the surface. 44 The right should be allowed
where it is reasonably necessary for mining and where its exercise
will not impose a substantial burden on the surface. A dissenting
140. See infra notes 201-214 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 190-199 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
143. Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 165 W. Va. 10, 267 S.E.2d 721 (1980).
144. Id. at 18, 267 S.E.2d at 725.
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opinion argued that this balancing test eliminated West Virginia's
traditional "intention of the parties" test of implied rights and al-
lowed the court to make contracts for the parties. 145
A second 1980 decision by the West Virginia court involved a
1902 mineral severance where the grantor had expressly reserved the
right to transport coal, workers, and equipment over the land to
operations on neighboring lands. 146 At issue was the right to use an
old haul road serving an abandoned deep mine to transport per-
sonnel and equipment to an adjoining surface mine. The court held
that the scope of an express easement, unlike an implied one, is
determined by the parties' intent at its creation; and their intent is
a question of fact, not of law. An express easement may not impose
a greater or different burden on the servient estate than the parties
had intended. Surface uses and mining technology at the time of
severance were relevant factors to be considered in determining the
easement's intended scope. 147 The case was remanded for a factual
determination of whether 1980 hauling technology is so substantially
different from 1902 technology as to "overburden" the surface es-
tate.
The scope of "reasonable necessity" does not remain constant.
Changes in technology (electric ventilating fans) and in regulation
(SMCRA) affect that term. The Eleventh Circuit has held that an
express right to use the surface for preparation and transportation
of minerals "from said land or other lands" was broad enough to
permit the mineral estate to create a nine acre sedimentation pond
for its coal cleaning plant on the surface estate. 48 The court failed
to discuss the question, but one wonders whether the sedimentation
pond was required under the operator's surface mining permit. The
result suggests, at least, that facilities required to satisfy new mining
regulations are within the mineral estate's surface use rights.
145. Id. at 21, 267 S.E.2d at 727.
146. Lowe v. Guyan Eagle Coals, Inc., 166 W. Va. 265, 273 S.E.2d 91 (1980).
147. Id. at 268, 273 S.E.2d at 93. See also Reimer v. Gulf Oil Co., 281 Ark. 377, 664 S.W.2d
456 (1984) (oil and gas lessee had express easement over surface to well on other land and would be
liable for unreasonable use of easement only.).
148. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining v. Shepherd, 888 F.2d 1533 (lth Cir. 1989).
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Conflict does not exist only between the surface and mineral
estates. An Indiana court recognized an implied easement through
coal estates severed between 1899 and 1905 to explore lower strata
for oil and gas. 149 The easement extended 300 feet in diameter from
the well bore because of federal law'50 requiring pillars of that size
to protect active oil and gas wells drilled through coal seams.' The
court's use of a statute, which was enacted long after the severance,
in order to define the easement offers further evidence of how new
governmental regulations can affect "reasonable necessity."
These cases are illustrative of the most important private law
issues confronting the mining industry today: What rights should
be implied from a severance of minerals from the surface estate?
What is the scope of rights expressly created in the severance in-
strument? Both of these questions must be answered in the context
of changing mining technology and changing demands for surface
use by both the mineral and surface owners. It is unlikely that the
parties to the 1890 severance could have foreseen the need for giant
electric motors and fans with attendant electrification facilities to
ventilate an 1890 mine. Nor does it seem likely that the 1902 grantor
would have anticipated the use of his land 70 years later for surface
mining on a neighbor's land, an activity probably unknown at the
time of the severance.
At the same time, the mineral estate can not be confined to
mining technology existing at the time of severance, even though
the impact of new technology on the surface may be greater than
the parties could have contemplated. Courts should not be Lud-
dites. 152 Even in 1890 and 1902, the fact of technological changes
should have been foreseeable, whether or not specific changes could
have been foreseen.
Nor should the scope of its mining rights be limited strictly to
those "reasonably necessary" to mine at the time of the severance.
149. Richardson v. Citizens Gas & Coke Util., 422 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. App. 1981).
150. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 863, 877(h) (1982).
151. Richardson, 422 N.E.2d at 713.
152. A group of early Nineteenth Century English textile workers who protested lower wages
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If mine operators, at the time of severance, were permitted to dis-
charge untreated acid mine drainage directly into surface streams, 53
but are now required to treat water discharges to prevent pollution,
54
use of the surface for a settling pond may be "reasonably necessary"
for mining operations. No federal legislation defined the minimum
size of coal pillars required to protect active gas wells in 1899. Yet,
if the size of an implied easement for drilling through a coal seam
were less than 300 feet in 1981, the well could not be sunk. The
oil and gas owner could not develop its property just as certainly
as if no separate oil and gas rights existed.
The mine operator, who is successful in these actions, can occupy
part of the surface estate at no additional cost while the surface
owner is denied some current use of its estate. This seeming un-
fairness has led several states to adopt legislation expressly requiring
the payment of damages to the surface estate owner for land used
by the mineral estate.155
The common law has a remarkable facility for adapting to meet
new societal needs. The West Virginia court's attempt at determining
the scope of mining rights by comparing the burden of an express
easement at the time of its creation to the burden at the time of
its exercise, or to balance inconveniences in the case of an implied
easement, are steps in the right direction. Unfortunately, these steps
fall far short of meeting current needs of either the mining industry
or the surface owner. Under either test, it is necessary to ask a court
to determine the scope of that right. Neither decision encourages
the parties to settle their disagreements privately.
In determining the parties' intent where the original severance is
silent, courts must resort to the theory of "general intent" in order
to conclude that the new right was conferred on the mineral estate.
Essentially, this "general intent" approach assumes that the mineral
estate was intended to have all rights necessary or appropriate for
mineral development unless its rights are specifically restricted in the
153. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126 (1886).
154. SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (10) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
155. See infra, notes 208-219 and accompanying text.
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severance document. 156 This theory implies that, at the time of sev-
erance, the surface owner anticipated specific technological and ec-
onomic changes far into the future and bargained for them in setting
the consideration to be paid for the severance. This is an unrealistic
burden to place upon both the parties, now long dead, and the
language, from times when modern mining methods and needs were
unknown.
The American Law Institute is engaged in a reformulation of
the law of easements and other servitudes. Tentative Draft No. 1
of the Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes, dealing with the
creation of servitudes, was approved at the Institute's annual meet-
ing in May, 1989. The Restatement will attempt to formulate a
"unified field theory" of servitudes-easements, profits, covenants,
equitable servitudes, and other rights incident to the ownership or
use of land.
According to the Restatement an easement by necessity arises
whenever a severance of a single estate into two or more fails to
create express rights in one parcel which are necessary for use and
enjoyment of the other. 157 Implied mining rights are within this pro-
vision. The commentary states, in part:
To support implication of a servitude under this section, the rights claimed must
be necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property. 'Necessary' rights are
not limited to those essential to enjoyment of the property, but include those
which are reasonably required to make effective use of the property. If the prop-
erty cannot otherwise be used without disproportionate effort or expense, the
rights are necessary within the meaning of this section. Reasonable enjoyment of
the property means use of all the normally usable parts of the property for uses
that would normally be made of that type of property.'58
The Restatement recognizes that the law should not freeze prop-
erty rights at the time of severance: "What is necessary depends on
the nature and location of the property and may change over
time. .. " " The parties may agree that there shall be no servitude
156. Kuntz, supra note 29.
157. RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES, § 2.15, comments a, b, illustrations 5-7
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1989).
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by necessity, but only by "language or circumstances of the con-
veyance [which] clearly indicate that the parties intended to deprive
the property of that right."' 6 An unarticulated intent should not
deprive a property owner of rights reasonably necessary for enjoy-
ment of that property.
16 1
Central to the availability of the right is its "reasonable neces-
sity" to the enjoyment of the severed estate. Unlike the West Vir-
ginia court, 162 the Restatement does not suggest balancing the necessity
of the right with its impact on the servient estate. Instead, it looks
to the right's necessity for enjoyment of the severed estate.
This provision is limited to rights implied from a severance be-
cause of "necessity." However, the same approach can be used in
interpreting express mining rights which are ambiguous or which,
because of changes in mining conditions or regulation, have become
ambiguous. The Institute has not yet considered the scope of express
servitudes. Mineral practitioners should be aware of these efforts
and should follow them closely.
2. Surface Mining
The mineral estate's rights as the dominant estate have never
been unlimited. At some point the mineral estate's activities affect
the surface estate so adversely that the surface estate becomes worth-
less. Courts in most eastern coal mining states are reluctant to find
that the surface owner intended to allow the mineral estate to destroy
the surface estate completely. Surface mining so substantially bur-
dens the surface estate that the right to engage in it should not rest
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES, § 2.15 (Tent. Draft. No. 1, 1989).
161. The RESTATEMENT discusses this point:
Because of the strong public policy favoring avoidance of the costs incurred on account
of unusable property, and the strong likelihood that the parties ... did not intend to deprive
it of its utility, servitudes by necessity will be implied unless it is clear that the parties
intend[ed] to deprive the property of rights necessary to its enjoyment. Thus servitudes
necessary to enjoyment of the property will be implied unless it affirmatively appears that
the parties did intend that result. Mere proof that they failed to consider access rights, or
incorrectly believed other means to be available, is not sufficient to justify exclusion of the
implied servitudes for rights necessary to its enjoyment. (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITruDEs § 2.15, comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1989).
162. Lowe, 166 W. Va. 265, 273 S.E.2d 91 (1980).
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upon implication. There must be some positive evidence of that in-
tent. 63 The evidence may be found in the language of the sever-
ance, 64 or it may be implied from facts which should have been
known to both parties when the severance occurred (e.g., mining
practices in the area).1 65
In most states, this limitation on the mineral estate developed
as a matter of common law, as a rule of construction of severance
instruments. However, the state legislatures of Tennessee and Ken-
tucky both sought to impose this limitation on their courts by stat-
ute. Both statutes were challenged on constitutional as well as other
grounds. The Tennessee statute,'6 which allowed surface mining only
if the severance contained express language to that effect or if sur-
face mining had been a common activity at the time of the severance,
applied only to surface mining of coal. The Tennessee Supreme
Court, in a case involving 50 and 60 year old severances, found that
the statute simply codified an accepted rule of construction. 67 Thus,
the statute did not violate the mineral estate's constitutional con-
tracts, due process, or equal protection rights. This approach also
enabled the court to avoid the question of legislative invasion of a
judicial function, the central issue in the Kentucky case. Moreover,
as a common law rule of construction, the Tennessee statute should
not be limited to surface mining of coal.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held its statute, which contained
almost identical language to that of Tennessee, to be an unconsti-
tutional invasion of judicial power by the legislature insofar as it
directed the interpretation of existing instruments. 68 The court did
allow the surface owner to recover damages for the injury to the
163. E.g., Franklin v. Callicoat, 119 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio 1954); Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa.
43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976); 'West Virginia
Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
164. E.g., Clearfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Shaffer, 381 Pa. Super. 259, 553 A.2d 455 (1989).
See also Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 383 (1976).
165. E.g., GRC Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Game Comnn'n, 437 A.2d 512 (Pa. Commw. 1981).
See generally Annot., supra note 164 at 427-33.
166. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 64-511 (Supp. 1980) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-102
(Rep. Vol. 1982)).
167. Doochin v. Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tenn. 1981).
168. Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
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surface. Damages are to be measured by the difference in the estate's
value before and after mining operations. Reclamation activities ac-
tually conducted by the mine operator are to be considered in de-
termining the land's post-mining value. As a result, Kentucky is the
only major eastern coal producing state with a common law basis
for permitting surface mining under deeds executed when that method
was not well known.1
69
The voting citizens of Kentucky were unhappy with the court's
decision. In 1988, they amended the Kentucky Constitution by add-
ing to it the precise language held unconstitutional by the court. 70
The federal constitutionality of this amendment is presently being
litigated. 17 The amendment limits mining methods to those known
in the community at the time of severance. If literally interpreted
and federally constitutional, it could prevent the use of continuous
mining machines, conveyor belts, and other common technological
advances in the mining of coal severed before these methods were
known. It is difficult to believe that the Kentucky voters intended
to require coal miners to work only with picks and shovels and to
remove the coal from the mines with mule drawn wagons. The Ken-
tucky court did give increased protection to owners whose land is
subject to surface mining under old deeds by making damages avail-
able as a matter of law.172
169. But see United States v. Steams Coal & Lumber Co., 816 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. Ky. 1987)
(Mineral owner which had conveyed surface to federal government in 1937 for national forest and
reserved minerals had not reserved right to conduct surface mining operations under Kentucky law;
court's reasoning was rejected by Kentucky Supreme Court in Akers, 736 S.W.2d 294, discussed In
supra note 168 and accompanying text.
170. Ky. CoNsr. § 19(2) (added November 11, 1988):
(2) In any instrument heretofore or hereafter executed purporting to sever the surface and
mineral estates or to grant a mineral estate or to grant a right to extract minerals, which
falls to state or describe in express and specific terms the method of coal extraction to be
employed, or where said instrument contains language subordinating the surface estate to
the mineral estate, it shall be held, in the absence of clear and convinvincing evidence to
the contrary, that the intention of the parties to the instrument was that the coal be extracted
only by the method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known to be in
use in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was executed, and that the
mineral estate be dominant to the surface estate for the purposes of coal extraction by only
the method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known to be in use in
Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was executed.
171. United States v. Steams Co., 873 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1989) (Current litigation No. 78-169, U.S.D.C.
W.D. Ky.).
172. The court made an exception for deeds executed between 1956, the date of its earlier decision
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The 80's saw further limitations on the mineral estate's right to
engage in surface mining activities, particularly under ancient sev-
erances. While Tennessee announced its approval of a rule of con-
struction limiting implied mining rights, the decision is more
important than it may, at first, seem. That state later repealed the
statute which prompted the litigation. By declaring that the statute
merely codified an existing rule of construction, the rule of the case
remains in force. Repeal of the statute does not repeal the common
law principle which that statute stated.
In Kentucky, the rule was moved, by action of the electorate,
from a statute to a constitutional principle. Should the amendment
withstand the federal constitutional challenges, it may more severely
restrict mining rights than judicially imposed constructional rules,
which can change with time as needed. Even if the amendment does
not pass federal constitutional muster, the Kentucky court has in-
creased the cost of exercising surface mining rights by making the
mineral estate strictly liable for damage to the surface estate from
that activity. Similarly, by holding that all substances of value pass
to the mineral estate under severances of "minerals" or "all min-
erals," subject to a duty to compensate for damage to the surface
from mining, Texas resolved this ownership question at a cost to
the mineral estate. 73
3. The Duty of Support and Longwall Mining Rights
Each estate, including each mineral estate, owes a duty of sup-
port to all estates lying above it, including the surface estate. 174 This
duty may exist as a servitude appurtenant to the surface or, as in
Pennsylvania, this duty may exist as a distinct estate in land.175 It
allowing surface mining under these deeds, and 1987, the date of the present decision. Akers, 736
S.W.2d at 307.
173. Moser v. U.S. Steel Co., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
174. For a survey of the origin of support rights in eastern states, see Ingram, Regulation of
Mine Subsidence-Legal Issues Raised by Government Intervention in Historically Private Arrange-
ments, 5 E. Mm. L. INsT. ch. 6 (1984).
175. Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416, 100 A. 1043 (1917).
1990]
43
Fox: Private Mining Law in the 1980's: The Last Ten Years and Beyond
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
may be waived by a surface owner, either in the mineral severance
or by a subsequent agreement. 17
6
Where not waived, the mineral estate has an "absolute" duty
to support the surface in its natural or unimproved state.'7 A Ken-
tucky court held that the extent of this duty should be determined
when the coal is removed, not at the time of the severance. 78 The
coal had been severed in 1905 and mining had continued until 1971.
The underground mine operator argued that its duty of support
should be fixed according to the reasonable uses to which the surface
might be put in 1905. Modern subdivision practices were unknown.
Subsistence farming required plots of 50 acres or more. That was
the "natural state" which the operator had to support. The court,
however, defined "natural state" as the condition of the surface,
including reasonable and foreseeable improvements thereon, at the
time the coal is severed, not from the fee, but from the earth.'
79
At the time of mining in 1948, surface use for a residential sub-
division was foreseeable. Therefore, the operator had to provide
support for that use, not for a 1905 subsistence farm.
The case was one of first impression. It indicates that the issue
of changing technology cuts both ways. If the mineral estate is per-
mitted to use more modern technology than existed at the time of
severance, the surface estate's right to enjoy similar technological
advances should likewise be recognized.
The right of the mineral estate to engage in longwall mining
operations has been under attack on many fronts. This method of
mining allows for greater recovery of coal at less cost than the more
traditional room and pillar mining method. It also results in faster
subsidence of overlying strata often with, at least temporary, surface
impacts.8 0 It has been suggested that, by reasoning similar to that
176. E.g., Eastwood Lands, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 417 So.2d 164 (Ala. 1982) (reservation of
minerals and right to mine without leaving support for surface barred action injury to shopping center
buildings as result of mining.).
177. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 820 (1977).
178. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
179. Id. at 344.
180. See EASTERN M mRAL LAW FOUNDATION, SPECIAL INSTITUTE ON SUBSmENCE (1989), for a
thorough discussion of longwall mining and subsidence effects.
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which limits surface mining rights, longwall mining could be re-
stricted to those severance instruments which expressly authorize it
or which were made after it became a recognized mining method. 181
A number of decisions at the end of the 80's rejected this ar-
gument, holding that longwall mining was permitted under various
older severance instruments. 18 2 Unfortunately, most of these deci-
sions are unpublished. Only one of these opinions is from the highest
court of any state. The well researched opinion of Judge Simmons
in Culp v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co. 183 deserves to be read care-
fully by anyone interested in this question. Judge Simmons found
that the impact of longwall mining on the surface is not comparable
to that of surface mining. Longwall mining is "an accepted method
of underground mining which was contemplated by both federal and
state mining regulations." Further, he found that it is not a "novel
process," as many have supposed. Quoting from various state and
other mining publications, he found that longwall mining was known
in the United States as early as 1874. For these reasons, he concluded
it did not have to be set forth in the severance instrument.
In Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co.,184 a divided Virginia Supreme
Court refused to enjoin longwall mining under plaintiffs' property
because plaintiffs could not show any irreparable injury. Plaintiffs'
support right had not been waived in the 1887 mineral severance.
Conceding that plaintiffs' right to support was "absolute," the ma-
jority concluded that this alone would not justify equitable relief;
injunctive relief requires some irreparable injury. Withdrawal of sup-
port, even surface subsidence, which does not "injure" the superior
estate, does not give rise to a cause of action. The "absolute" nature
of the support right means only that liability for injury from with-
181. For a summary of the arguments for and against this position, see McGinley, Does the
Right to Mine Coal under a Lease or Deed Include the Right to Extract by Longwall Mining Methods?
5 E. Mni. L. INsT. ch. 5 (1984.
182. Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co., 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989); Culp v. Consol Penn-
sylvania Coal Co., No. 87-1688 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989) (1989 WL 101553, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8193 Genfed library, Dist. file); Wells v. American Elec. Power Co., No. 441 (Ohio Ct. App., July
29, 1989); Porter v. Consolidation Coal Co., (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd without published opinion, 870
F.2d 651 (3rd Cir. 1989); Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783 (Va. 1990).
183. Culp, No. 87-1688 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989).
184. 387 S.E.2d 783 (Va. 1990).
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drawal of support is absolute, not that support must be provided
where its withdrawal works no injury.
The surface estate at issue was unimproved and uninhabited tim-
berland, Longwall mining would result in swales three feet deep,
600 feet wide, and 3,000 to 5,000 feet long over the surface." 5 There
would be no surface cracking and a surface stream would not be
affected by subsidence from the mining. Although the dissenters
found this to be sufficient injury to surface owners to justify an
injunction, the majority held that an injunction was not warranted.
The majority opinion should not be read as suggesting that a surface
owner may never be able to enjoin longwall mining beneath its prop-
erty; however, in order to do so, the owner must prove "irreparable
injury" to the surface beyond the mere loss of subjacent support
itself. Presumably, the result would have been different had the
plaintiffs been able *to show that the subsidence would have dimin-
ished the value of the surface or would otherwise have interfered
with its use.
The majority rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that this action was
comparable to one brought to enjoin a continuing trespass, for which
no physical damage need be proven. 186 In this case, the defendant
had the right to mine the coal in question. Therefore, defendant's
conduct was not a trespass.
The two dissenting justices found "irreparable injury" from the
withdrawal of support and its impact on the surface. To them, "the
destruction of an absolute property right, is, in itself, an injury
subject to injunctive relief.' ' 87
A federal district court in Virginia held that a mine operator was
not liable for damage to the surface from vibrations, subsidence,
and escaping methane gas as result of longwall operations.'88 Plain-
tiffs' predecessor in title had waived its right to subjacent support
and to damages from mining. Despite the fact that the parties to
185. Id. at 786.
186. Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., 128 Va. 383, 398-99, 105 S.E. 117, 122 (1920).
187. Large, 387 S.E.2d at 787.
188. Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co., 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989).
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the waiver had not contemplated longwall mining, the waiver was
held to be valid because they had contemplated damage to the sur-
face from mining.
B. Statutory Influences
Mineral lapse statutes are a form of direct legislative intervention
in the allocation of private rights. They reflect value choices made
by the elected community representatives regarding relative devel-
opment priorities. These statutes can foster mineral development as
easily as they can hinder it. Indeed, one suspects that only the most
sophisticated surface owners rely on the availability of these statutes
to clear title. Probably most actions are brought at the suggestion
of third parties desiring to develop the minerals who can not do so
while they remain in their present ownership state.
Other statutes have been found to have a bearing on the de-
velopment of mineral lands in rather unusual or unexpected ways.
The federal and state surface mining acts were enacted to achieve
public goals, primarily environmental protection. 189 Yet they are be-
ginning to play an important role in the private rights of surface
and mineral estate owners. Surface owners and courts are discov-
ering new theories on which to reestablish rights seemingly waived
in earlier severances. Several states have enacted statutes requiring
the mineral estate to pay damages for use of or interference with
the surface. Where these statutes also authorize the mineral estate
to use the surface without hinderance by the surface owner, in ex-
change for damage payments, they provide benefits to both parties.
1. Environmental Protection Statutes
Pennsylvania's bituminous coal mine subsidence statute'90 pro-
hibits underground mining of bituminous coal in a manner which
will cause subsidence of the surface. It also requires protection for
189. See SMCRA, §§ 101, 102, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (1982),
190. PA. STAT. Am. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-.21 (Purdon & Supp. 1989), For a discussion of the
constitutionality of this act, see Fox, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Coal
Mining Activities, 3 J. MiN. L, & POL'Y 1 (1987),
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certain designated structures and surface features. 19t An operator
whose activities have damaged a protected structure or feature must
either repair it or compensate the owner for the resulting damage. 192
This liability exists even though the surface owner's right to support
had been waived earlier when the surface and coal estates were sev-
ered. 93 The operator's liability is statutorily based, rather than being
based upon the common law right of support. It is absolute lia-
bility, 94 which is measured by the cost to repair the damaged struc-
ture, not by the diminution in value of the property. 195 The operator
is liable for all damages legally caused by its failure to provide the
statutorily required support'9 6 or notice of mining.197 The statute does
not protect separately owned strata between an active mine and the
surface. 198
An Illinois federal district court held that that state's surface
mining act invalidated an earlier damage waiver by a surface owner
from deep mining activities to the extent that restoration or com-
pensation was required by the act. 199 However, the compensation
provisions of that act apply only to damage actually resulting from
subsidence; they do not require compensation for costs incurred by
a surface owner to avoid subsidence damage.200
In Rose v. Oneida Coal Co.,201 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals refused to award damages for injury to plaintiffs' surface
from subsidence because of a waiver in the severance instrument.
However, the court suggested that the state's surface mining act may
191. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
192. Id. § 1406.6.
193. Patton v. Republic Steel Corp., 342 Pa. Super. 101, 492 A.2d 411 (1985).
194. Deluca v. Buckeye Coal Co., 463 Pa. 513, 518, 345 A.2d 637, 639 (1975).
195. Wright v. Buckeye Coal Co., 290 Pa. Super. 231, 434 A.2d 728 (1981).
196. Albig v. Municipal Authority, 348 Pa. Super. 505, 502 A.2d 658 (1985) (water escaped
from public reservoir, a protected structure, and damages plaintiff's properties; act imposes absolute
duty on mine operator to prevent subsidence under protected structures; operator liable for all damages
legally caused by its failure to provide support, not just for damage to protected structure.).
197. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 10 (Purdon 1966); Patton, 342 Pa. Super. 101, 492 A.2d 411.
198. George v. Pennsylvania Dep't. of Envtl. Resources, 102 Pa. Commw. 87, 517 A.2d 578
(1986); Culp v. Consol Penna. Coal Co., 96 Pa. Commw. 99, 506 A.2d 988 (1986).
199. Melvin v. Old Ben Coal Co., 612 F. Supp. 1204 (S.D. I11. 1985) (Melvin II); Melvin v.
Old Ben Coal. Co., 610 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (Melvin I).
200. Shell Oil Pipe Line Corp. v. Old Ben Coal Co., 677 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Iii. 1988).
201. 375 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1988).
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have created private rights not covered by the earlier waiver. Its
affirmance of summary judgment for defendant was expressly with-
out prejudice to plaintiffs' right to bring a later action under that
theory.2 2 The court observed: "Although we believe that [the West
Virginia surface mining act] has changed many of the old common
law rules concerning the rights and remedies of surface owners vis
a vis mineral owners, the dimensions of those changes are as yet
uncertain. "203
In a later case, that same court held a waiver of support and
damages in a 1907 severance was insufficient to waive the state sur-
face mining act's prohibition against mining within 300 feet of an
occupied dwelling. 204 The act contemplates a knowing and specific
consent to mining within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling. The court
did not believe that a damage waiver executed when this consent
requirement did not exist could be extended to meet the statutory
mandate because the statute could not have been within the con-
templation of the parties to the 1907 severance. A new consent from
the present owner is required to permit mining within 300 feet of
plaintiffs' homes.
In these cases, courts are finding private duties in public statutes.
Their action is not without precedent. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts recognizes that private causes of action may be based upon
public or statutory duties in appropriate cases. The Restatement
indicates when and how courts may look to legislation or admin-
istrative regulation to determine a standard of conduct for the "rea-
sonable person." Violation of that standard may be negligence
per se or the standard may only be evidence of negligence. 20 7
Courts may be going beyond the Restatement in these cases.
Waivers in early severances often include both the common law duty
202. Id. at 816.
203. Id. For a cryptic statement that Pennsylvania's subsidence act was intended to modify the
common law of support in a manner adverse to the owner of an underlying coal seam, see George,
102 Pa. Commw. 87, 89 n.5, 517 A.2d 578, 580 n.5.
204. Cogar v. Sommerville, 379 S.E.2d 764 (W. Va. 1989). The statutory prohibition, W. VA.
CODE § 22A-3-22(d)(4) (1985), implements SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1982).
205. RESTATEm'ENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §§ 285-288C (1976).
206. Id. § 285.
207. Id. § 288B.
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of subjacent support and liability for negligent conduct. Essentially,
these courts are limiting severance waivers to common law liability
as it existed at the time of severance. This treatment favors the
present surface owner who is given the benefit of new statutory
duties despite an earlier waiver of a similar common law liability.
It is, however, inconsistent with those decisions which refuse to limit
mining technology or surface use to conditions existing at the time
of severance.
2. Surface Damages Statutes
A number of mineral producing states have enacted statutes im-
posing liability on a mineral developer for use of or injury to the
surface estate. 208 Although its act is limited to oil and gas opera-
tions,20 the Oklahoma experience is instructive.
Oklahoma passed its surface damages act in 1982. The act's con-
stitutionality was established in Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud.210 The Davis
majority held that the statute does no more than modify a per-
missible defense to an action brought by the surface owner for dam-
ages, a matter within the competence of the legislature and not
proscribed by the state or federal constitution's contracts or due
208. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96, paras. 9651-9657 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-
5-7-1 to -6 (Burns Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 to 511 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 38-18-01 to -08 (1987) (coal operations); Id. §§ 38-11.1-01 to -10 (1987 and Supp. 1989) (oil &
gas operations) (upheld against constitutional challenge in Murphy v. Amoco Production Co., 729
F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1984); Omo RPv. CODE Am. § 1509.072 (Page Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 52, §§ 318.1-318.9 (West Supp. 1990) (upheld against constitutional challenge in Davis Oil Co.
v. Cloud, 766 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1986); S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. §§ 45-5A-1 to -11 (1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 60-1-601 to -608 (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE § 22-8-7 (Supp. 1989) (oil and gas)
(upheld against constitutional challenge in Devon Oil Corp. v. Miller, 280 S.E.2d 108 (W. Va. 1981);
W. VA. CODE § 22B-2-1 to -9 (1985). For some unanswered constitutional issues, see Lowe, Eastern
Oil and Gas Operations: Do Recent Developments Suggest New Answers to Old Problems? 4 E. MIN.
L. INST. ch. 20, 20-18 to 20-23 (1983).
209. Alpine Constr. Corp. v. Fenton, 764 P.2d 1340 (Okla. 1988) (legislature limited benefit of
act to oil and gas operations; coal operator's reclamation duties surface mining act and waiver of
damages from mining in severance preclude surface owner's right to injunction.).
210. 766 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1986 [sic]). (The original decision of court was written in 1986 but
not released for publication until January of 1989, following denial of a request for rehearing. The
1986 opinion was written by Justice Lavender for a unanimous court, one justice noting a dissent
as to the retroactive effect of the statute. The decision as finally published continues Justice Lavender's
opinion unchanged as the majority opinion. However, four of the nine members of the court dissent
as to the retroactive effect of the statute in an opinion by Justice Summers).
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process clauses. However, the dissent opined that requiring the min-
eral estate to compensate for actions which are not negligent or
wilful was a retroactive modification of vested rights.
As with other state statutes, the Oklahoma act replaces common
law liability for negligence or nuisance with a strict liability stan-
dard.211 The act expands the nature of damages from production
activities beyond the "unreasonable and unnecessary" standard of
the common law. 212 Operators must negotiate damage payments with
the surface owner before beginning operations. However, these re-
quirements are imposed only upon an "operator" as defined in the
statute. 213 Unlike the statutes of other states, a lessee with the right
to enter and explore for hydrocarbons is not an "operator" during
exploratory activities. The availability of statutory damages bars a
surface owner's action for common law nuisance, even where the
lessee enters without attempting to comply with the act.
214
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has been developing what is now entitled "The Model Surface
Use and Damages Act." This Act would grant a severed mineral
interest the right to use the surface for limited purposes and would
require the mineral developer to pay damages to the surface owner.
Damages are defined in a manner similar to rent for portions of
the surface actually occupied by the developer or made unavailable
to the surface owner during development activities. Additional dam-
ages, similar to consequential damages, exist for actual injury to the
surface or designated surface features.
The Model Act could potentially bring about significant changes
in the law of many eastern states. For example, Pennsylvania law
does not allow a mineral owner to engage in surface mining unless
the severance document contains "some positive indications that the
parties ... agreed to authorize" this method of mining.215 On the
other hand, the Kentucky Supreme Court allows surface mining with
211. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 318.1, 318.8 (West Supp. 1990).
212. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc. v. Simpson, 735 P.2d 1206 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
213. Anshutz Corp. v. Sanders, 734 P.2d 1290 (Okla. 1987).
214. Darling v. Quail Creek Petroleum Corp., 778 P.2d 943 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989).
215. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
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no evidence of the parties' intent216 even though a similar deed in
Pennsylvania would not permit surface mining. Kentucky requires
the mineral estate to compensate the surface estate for damages from
mining. Thus, the Model Act can be read as opting for the Kentucky
solution for all states.
The respective rights of owners of severed minerals and surface
estates traditionally have been governed by the apparent intent of
the parties to the original severance instrument. Their intent has been
determined from the language in that instrument and admissible ex-
trinsic evidence. At present there is no uniform rule for determining
what specific language constitutes a waiver of surface support or of
liability for injury to or destruction of the surface estate.217 Surface
damages acts, including the draft Model Act, seek to substitute a
legislative judgment as to the allocation of loss from mineral de-
velopment for the parties' intended allocation of that loss.
These efforts may reflect a dissatisfaction with the traditional
way of allocating losses by contract. At the very least, they reflect
a dissatisfaction with the consequences of ancient severances when
liability was measured by different, far less intensive surface activ-
ities.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are some lessons to be learned from these cases of the
1980's. Courts have not deviated from tradition when interpreting
the language of conveyances. Within limits, courts still will protect
expectations which the parties indicate they intend to have protected.
However, there is a demand for a higher standard of fair dealing
when the parties are not equally knowledgeable of relevant facts or
do not possess equal bargaining power.
Courts and legislatures are becoming increasingly impatient when
rights created long ago remain unused or, when asserted, conflict
216. Akers v. Baldwin, supra n. 168.
217. Lopez, Upstairs Downstairs: Conflict Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 22 RocKY MTN.
Mni. L. INST. 203 (1976); 6 Ammruc L. oF MRnNG § 200.02[l][b][iii] n.3 (2d ed. 1988).
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with the interests or needs of current owners. Whether in the form
of dormant mineral statutes or new sources of surface owner rights,
the tendency is to favor the present developer over the dormant one
and the surface owner over the mineral owner. This is not always
the case, of course, but it is so more often than ever in the past.
Some trends suggested in this article will undoubtedly influence
the development of private mineral law in the 1990's. Others may
prove to be only excursions and alarums. 218 Because changes in the
common law of private relationships occur case by case, they become
noticeable only after several similar decisions. It is easy not to rec-
ognize them as changes while they are developing. However, it is
important to be aware of the possibility of change rather than wait
until a change has become part of the common law and is, itself,
entrenched as precedent.
218. Those rapid and noisy, temporary movements of large numbers of people in the background
of Elizabethan dramas. They exist more for momentary effect than as important parts of the plot.
E.g., RIcHARD III, act V, scene iv; HENRY V, act IV, scene iv.
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